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ABSTRACT
Our daily life is becoming more and more reliant on services provided by the in-
frastructures power, gas , communication networks. Ensuring the security of these
infrastructures is of utmost importance. This task becomes ever more challenging as
the inter-dependence among these infrastructures growsand a security breach in one
infrastructure can spill over to the others. The implication is that the security prac-
tices/analysis recommended for these infrastructures should be done in coordination.
This thesis, focusing on the power grid, explores strategies to secure the system that
look into the coupling of the power grid to the cyber infrastructure, used to manage
and control it, and to the gas grid, that supplies an increasing amount of reserves to
overcome contingencies.
The first part (Part I) of the thesis, including chapters 2 through 4, focuses on
the coupling of the power and the cyber infrastructure that is used for its control and
operations. The goal is to detect malicious attacks gaining information about the
operation of the power grid to later attack the system. In chapter 2, we propose a
hierarchical architecture that correlates the analysis of high resolution Micro-Phasor
Measurement Unit (µPMU) data and traffic analysis on the Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) packets, to infer the security status of the grid and
detect the presence of possible intruders. An essential part of this architecture is
tied to the analysis on the µPMU data. In chapter 3 we establish a set of anomaly
detection rules on µPMU data that flag “abnormal behavior”. A placement strategy
of µPMU sensors is also proposed to maximize the sensitivity in detecting anomalies.
In chapter 4, we focus on developing rules that can localize the source of an events
using µPMU to further check whether a cyber attack is causing the anomaly, by
correlating SCADA traffic with the µPMU data analysis results. The thread that
unifies the data analysis in this chapter is the fact that decision are made without
i
fully estimating the state of the system; on the contrary, decisions are made using
a set of physical measurements that falls short by orders of magnitude to meet the
needs for observability. More specifically, in the first part of this chapter (sections 4.1-
4.2), using µPMU data in the substation, methodologies for online identification of
the source Thevenin parameters are presented. This methodology is used to identify
reconnaissance activity on the normally-open switches in the substation, initiated
by attackers to gauge its controllability over the cyber network. The applications
of this methodology in monitoring the voltage stability of the grid is also discussed.
In the second part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localization
of faults. Since the number of PMU sensors available to carry out the inference
is insufficient to ensure observability, the problem can be viewed as that of under-
sampling a “graph signal”; the analysis leads to a PMU placement strategy that can
achieve the highest resolution in localizing the fault, for a given number of sensors.
In both cases, the results of the analysis are leveraged in the detection of cyber-
physical attacks, where µPMU data and relevant SCADA network traffic information
are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system
information and/or operations.
In second part of this thesis (Part II), the security analysis considers the ade-
quacy and reliability of schedules for the gas and power network. The motivation for
scheduling jointly supply in gas and power networks is motivated by the increasing
reliance of power grids on natural gas generators (and, indirectly, on gas pipelines)
as providing critical reserves. Chapter 5 focuses on unveiling the challenges and
providing solution to this problem.
ii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Designing secure practices and schedules for the operation of the critical infrastruc-
tures cannot be achieved if one looks at these infrastructures as independent entities.
In fact, as the inter-dependency between these infrastructures increases, any practice
and schedule should be in coordination with the coupled entities. We focus on the
power system as the main critical infrastructure of interest and study the security
issues that might arise due the coupling of this grid with the cyber network and the
gas grid.
Power grid operation has heavily become reliant on the communication network
for information exchange and control of the assets. Adding this cyber layer on the top
of the physical power grid has introduced vulnerabilities in the grid since the common
industrial protocols that are used are not secure in design. Therefore, breaking into
this network by hackers means that the underlying physical grid is at a high risk to
be compromised or to be disrupted from doing its normal operation. For example,
the results of a successful cyber attack on the Ukraine power grid that occurred in
2015 were:
• 30 substations were switched off,
• about 230,000 people did not have electricity for a period from 1 to 6 hours.
Part I of this thesis that includes chapters 2 through 4 investigates the security
of the power distribution grid due to the coupling with the cyber network. More
specifically, an architecture is proposed in chapter 2 that receives physical data from
Micro Phasor Measurement Units (µPMUs) and cyber packets sniffed by the packet
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sniffers from the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) to analyze and
cross-correlate the data based on a set of defined rules and decide whether an intrusion
has happened. Since this architecture heavily relies on the analysis of the data from
µPMUs for intrusion detection, a set of anomaly detection rules for distribution grid
are proposed in 3. Having an event detected is necessary but it is not sufficient most
of the times. In chapter 4, we focus on methods to localize the source of an event. The
results of the µPMU-based event source identification can then be compared to the
corresponding mirrored SCADA to check whether the two sources of information are
in agreement. In particular, we first discuss a “reconnaissance activity” identification
method for normally-open switches in the substation (sections 4.1-4.2). In the next
part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localization of faults using
µPMU data, in an operating regime where the number of µPMU sensors available to
carry out the inference is insufficient to have observability.
The second part of this thesis investigates the coupling between the power and
gas grid and analyzes the security challenges that might arise due to this coupling.
The share of the gas-fired generators to produce electricity has been growing over the
past few years. Figure. 1.0.1 shows the share of each of the resources in producing
electricity in the US. It can be observed that natural-gas fired generators produce
a significant portion of electricity in the US. This observation has been quantified
in Figure. 1.0.2 and proves the point. It implies that the power grid would heavily
rely on the gas network to be able to produce enough electricity to serve the cus-
tomers. Therefore, a secure operation of the power network in terms of adequacy of
generation and reliability of the service cannot be guaranteed unless the schedule is
in coordination with the constraints of the gas network. Part II of this thesis that
includes chapter 5 is dedicated to investigate the impact of uncoordinated scheduling
of power and gas grid on security of the power grid and to propose a methodology
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Figure 1.0.1: How the US Generates its Electricity?
Figure 1.0.2: Share of U.S. Electricity Generation. source: U.S. Energy Information
Agency.
for security-constrained scheduling of power and gas grid.
The breakdown of introduction of each of these two parts are given in the following:
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1.1 Part I-Cyber-Physical Security of Power Distribution Grid
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports, the so-
phistication and frequency of the attacks on the power grid are increasing [tec(2015)].
For example, a recent report on the Ukraine attack [cbc news Technology and Sci-
ence(2016)] showed how a failure in the communication network security resulted in
significant power outages. The Stuxnet malware or the sewage spill incident at the
Maroochy Water Station, due to the wireless attack, are other examples showcasing
how a misinformed control system can lead to catastrophic consequences.
Cyber security for energy delivery systems has, until now, focused primarily on the
transmission grid and on securely transferring bits of information about the condition
of power-grid elements (e.g., “Is this switch open or closed?”, “Which tap is selected
on this transformer?”) and preventing unauthorized access to sensor and control
packets. Once that access has been gained, there is little remediation action for
the power grid, other than a communications blackout and manual fieldwork. The
industry is seeking new approaches to this problem, also focusing on understanding
security at the distribution level, in anticipation to a growth in automation.
While transmission grids states have been tightly monitored and their behavior
at the physical level is reasonably well understood, the operators have been largely
blind towards the real time condition of the distribution grid. Hence, in tandem
with the effort of gaining situational awareness on the security of the system there
is a growing need and interest in the deployment of sensors, like the µPMUs that
can capture the state at the distribution level [Eto et al.(2015)]. These devices,
recently developed by PSL [Power Standards Lab(2016)], address both the technical
and economic barriers limiting the deployment of conventional PMUs, which are
aimed at the transmission grid, for the distribution level [von Meier et al.(2014)].
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Fig. 1.1.1a shows a sample µPMU device installed in the partner utility grid. These
devices sample at a rate of 120 samples/sec the three phase voltage and current
phasors. In comparison to SCADA that samples power flow and power injections
every 3-5 minutes, µPMU provides significantly more information, and often nuances
which are missed in SCADA data, as illustrated in the example in Fig. 1.1.1b. In this
example, the magnitude of the current measured by the SCADA meter is missing an
overcurrent event that µPMU could capture. This information may prove critical in
identifying cyber-attacks.
However, visualizing and interpreting raw sensor streams can be overwhelming for
DSOs, considering the large quantity of data that could flow in from different parts of
the grid [Kezunovic et al.(2013)]. Therefore, it is essential to mine the data collected
with analytic tools that can derive informative measurements and form automated
reports.
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, we propose an architecture for analysis of the
µPMU data and sniffed SCADA packets in a hierarchical manner to alarm the opera-
tor about a possible cyber attack on the grid [Jamei et al.(2016)]. Due to the critical
role of µPMUs in this framework, we establish a set of rules in chapter 3 that are
implemented in this architecture and look at the µPMU data at different levels of
aggregation to flag any anomalies [Jamei et al.(2017b), Jamei et al.(2017c)]. These
anamolous segments of data are filtered out for further co-analysis with the cyber
packets to distinguish between a natural anomaly and a malicious one.
In chapter 4, a set of rules are developed to localize an event and be able to
verify whether the SCADA-reported data is in agreement with the µPMU-based data
analysis. In particular, in sections 4.1-4.2 we fist propose a methodology for online
estimation of the Thevenin source parameters using µPMU data in balanced and
unbalanced grid [Jamei et al.(2017a)]. An application that relates this part of the
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.1.1: (a) µPMU Instrument from Power Sensors Ltd, (b) Measurement Com-
parison of µPMU and SCADA
chapter to the cyber-physical security of distribution grid is when these parameters
are used to infer the status of the normally-open switch at the substation. The
point here is that an attacker may launch “reconnaissance activities” in the grid to
gauge his controllability over the assets. A point of interest for this type of attack
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would be the manipulation of the normally-open switch at a substation between two
parallel transformers since it does not interrupt/change the delivery of the power to
downstream feeder. Using µPMU data to estimate the Thevenin source parameters,
we can infer about the status of these switches and compare it to what SCADA data
represent to understand a possible breach in the system. However, the contribution
of this work goes beyond that and includes the application of these parameters in
monitoring the voltage stability index.
In the next part of this chapter (sections 4.3-4.5), we investigate the localiza-
tion of faults using µPMU data, in an operating regime where the number of sen-
sors available to carry out the inference is insufficient to have observability [Jamei
et al.(2018a),Jamei et al.(2018c)]. The problem can be viewed as that of sampling a
graph signal and the analysis leads to a µPMU placement strategy that can achieve
the highest resolution in localizing the fault, for a given number of sensors. In addi-
tion to verifying our theory, in our numerical analysis our strategy is leveraged in the
detection of cyber-physical attacks, where µPMU data and relevant SCADA network
traffic information are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the
integrity of the system information and/or operations.
1.1.1 Prior Work and Contributions
Intrusion Detection Architecture: The first steps in adding security in oper-
ational environments are typically to deploy firewalls and device-level authentication.
Encryption is often also added to enhance confidentiality and integrity of the message
content. Another common security mechanism on computer networks is intrusion de-
tection, in which network traffic is monitored and analyzed to detect activities that
either fit into a “known bad” category or deviate in a statistically significant way
from “normal.” The Tofino Security Appliance, the Digital Bond Quickdraw SCADA
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intrusion detection system, the Radiflow Secure Gateway, the Bro Security Frame-
work [Berthier et al.(2010)] are all examples of network intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) that can be applied to control systems.
Numerous examples have shown that all of these methods leave significant gaps in
security and safety [Slay and Miller(2008)]. It has been recognized that one of the rea-
sons for this is that most of these security methods are divorced from the knowledge
of the physics of the system, its safe operations and limits, and its current physical
operating point. This gap was recognized early on by e.g. [Ca´rdenas et al.(2011)].
Some of our own previous work for monitoring SCADA traffic expanded the notion
of intrusion detection by leveraging the laws of physics governing the grid and impos-
ing them as security constraints [McParland et al.(2014), Koutsandria et al.(2015)].
Nonetheless, these methods also remain blind to more sophisticated attacks. One
reason is that the data coming from SCADA systems are not updated with high fre-
quency, so events causing many changes in a short period of time can be missed. In
addition, attackers can inject false data at the device level, thus evading detection by
the IDS.
An underpinning of the activity described in our work is to design a security
framework in anticipation of the impending move towards Advanced Distribution
Management System (ADMS). ADMS limits the need for direct human intervention,
and when working properly, its functionalities enhance the reliability and safety of
the system. While ADMSs are developed with careful consideration for safe physical
operation, a number of their features make them uniquely vulnerable to cyber-attacks
[Tesfay et al.(2014)]. In ADMS, a SCADA network is responsible to collect the
information from field devices (e.g. switches, meters ...), and send back the according
control commands. The presence of such network opens up a large attack surface.
What makes the case even more challenging is that ADMS is an integrated network,
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so failures in one section could cascade into a large and widespread series of events.
In particular, communication that lacks end-to-end security can permit difficult-to-
detect interference between sub-systems that could cause them to function in ways
that threaten the safety and reliability of the power grid. Additionally, unlike modern
computer systems that are upgraded every three to six years, many of the CPSs, such
as electric power system equipped with ADMS are amalgam of decades-old and very
new components, operating side by side often with inconsistent operating controls,
algorithms and guidelines.
The work in [Mitchell and Chen(2014)] gives a detailed survey on the IDSs that
are designed to enhance the security of CPSs. Figure 1.1.2 obtained from this work
categorizes different approaches of designing an IDS for a CPSs. Our approach here
Figure 1.1.2: CPS Intrusion Detection Tree [Mitchell and Chen(2014)]
is a mix of auditing materials at the network level for the SCADA traffic anomaly
detection and behavior-specification based techniques, where the legitimate behavior
is defined and intrusion is detected when the system departs from this model.
To ensure that ADMS operates and fails in well-understood and controlled ways,
one needs to tightly monitor the parts most exposed to an attack. The level of
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monitoring in CPSs is often a compromise between two competing design mandates:
least function (design systems as simple as possible to perform their grid management
functions); and robust monitoring (incorporate high-fidelity system status indicators
to enable detection of and response to cyber-security events). Our framework leans
towards the second predicament through the integration of µPMUs information in
the security architecture, which provides a clear image of the physical trail left by
cyber-physical-attacks.
µPMU Data Anomaly Detection: In the context of gaining awareness us-
ing synchrophaor data, recent work has focused on the PMU data utilization at
the transmission level to improve the Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Con-
trol [Phadke and de Moraes(2008),Terzija et al.(2011)]. Distribution grids, however,
are still lagging in that respect, since tools for the transmission grid may not be di-
rectly applicable to the distribution grid due to a different operation environment,
such as load imbalances, untransposed lines, and the existence of single-phase and
two-phase laterals. Transmission operations and system wide analysis are concerned
with large imbalances in load and generation, and as a result frequency, whereas
distribution operations are concerned with localized, but frequent events such as
voltage imbalance, overloading, and outage management. Most of the prior research
on sensor data analytics (including SCADA and PMU measurements) is concerned
with detecting events on the grid transmission level. For example, Pan et al., [Pan
et al.(2015)] use data mining techniques on PMU measurements and audit logs for
event classification. A linear basis expansion for the PMU data is described by Chen
et al., [Chen et al.(2013), Xie et al.(2014)] for event detection application. A simi-
lar approach, based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA), is used in [Valenzuela
et al.(2013),Ge et al.(2015)] for event detection and data archival. Allen et al., [Allen
et al.(2014)] describe the use of voltage phasor angle differences between different
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PMU readings to detect events. Biswal et al., [Biswal et al.(2016)] use the strongest
signatures of event in PMU data for situational awareness enhancement. A study by
Brahma et al., [Brahma et al.(2016)] describes the real-time dynamic event identifica-
tion in power system using PMU data based on a data-driven and also physics-based
method.
Our approach for event detection using µPMU data is a combination of the data-
driven methods, as well as criteria resulting from analyzing the underlying physical
model of the system. Unlike model agnostic machine learning methods that look for
statistical anomalies in a feature space that is often heuristic, the anomalies that
algorithms in this chapter identify are defined in the context of power quality and
protection, in addition to what is imposed by the grid governing physical equations
(i.e. Kirchhoff Voltage and Current Laws). This, in turn, gives a DSO much greater
insight and help in the forensic analysis. Because of the important role played by
µPMU data in the framework, a µPMU placement optimization with limited number
of the sensors is described, to achieve the maximum sensitivity in detecting a change1.
Event Localization: The contributions and the review of the related work of
this chapter is divided into two sections, where the first section discusses Thevenin
estimation and substation normally-open switch monitoring and the second section
discusses the related works in the fault localization domain and cyber-security of the
fault detectors.
Thevenin Estimation: Many studies focus on estimating Thevenin parameters
from field sensors, such as PMUs. Most of these studies are at the transmission
level, where the grid is typically balanced. Vu et al. [Vu et al.(1999)] used the lin-
ear, least-square method to solve for the Thevenin parameters and employed the
1Note that PMU placement studies for state estimation are not applicable here since the state is
not directly observable by solely depending on the µPMUs due to the scarcity of sensors.
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Thevenin impedance to apparent load impedance ratio (well-known L-index) to mon-
itor the voltage stability margin. Using two consecutive phasor measurements, Smon
et al. [Smon et al.(2006)] employ Tellegen’s theorem and the notion of adjoint networks
to estimate the Thevenin circuit and apply this analytic to monitor grid stability. Tsai
et al. [Tsai and Wong(2008)] use recursive least-square to estimate Thevenin param-
eters and track the voltage stability margin. Corsi et al. [Corsi and Taranto(2008)]
propose adaptive identification of Thevenin voltage and impedance equivalents with
real-time voltage instability monitoring purposes. Wang et al. [Wang et al.(2013)]
estimate the equivalent Thevenin circuit of generators and incorporate the estimated
model to extend the traditional L-index. Yuan et al. [Yuan and Li(2014)] conduct
a comparative study between different PMU-based methods of Thevenin equivalents
identification in terms of how fast and accurate each method is. Others [Abdelkader
and Morrow(2012), Alinejad and Karegar(2016)] identify the adverse effect of quasi
steady-state condition in the grid on Thevenin parameter estimation, and propose
to estimate the off-nominal frequency and compensate for this phenomena to obtain
accurate solutions. The authors in [Parniani et al.(2006), Arefifar and Xu(2009)] es-
timate the Thevenin parameters in a non-linear least-square setting considering the
variations of the Thevenin voltage source angle. Using measurements from a load
busbar in an unbalanced distribution grid, Hart [Hart(1986)] proposes a method that
requires only RMS values of the voltage to estimate the Thevenin circuit in a three-
phase, 3- or 4-wire system.
In this chapter, using the synchrophasor voltage and current measurements at the
substation, we propose methods for estimating the Thevenin source impedance and
voltage corresponding to substations delivering power to an unbalanced and balanced
feeder. The advent of µPMU sensors, which measure the three-phase voltage and
current phasor at different points over the distribution grid [von Meier et al.(2014)],
12
enables analytics that are similar to the ones at the transmission level. However, the
extension to the distribution grid requires care, as distribution feeders are typically
unbalanced. In the unbalanced case, we take advantage of having non-zero negative
and zero sequence to estimate not only the voltage and positive sequence impedance
but also the zero sequence source impedance. It should be noted that the use of
synchrophasor data for Thevenin estimation is a side benefit of PMUs but it does not
mean that obtaining required input data for Thevenin estimation is not possible with
current facilities other than PMUs.
In the case of balanced grid, we propose a new method that is effective even when
the system of equations are close to be rank-deficient. In our proposed approach,
only the magnitude of the Thevenin voltage and Thevenin impedance are assumed
to be constant over a short window, and no assumption is made about the angle
of the Thevenin voltage source. This in fact improves the results as compared to
the methods that require the Thevenin voltage angle to be constant over a window
of samples; an assumption that is not valid in practice. In this sense, our work is
similar to the proposed methods in [Parniani et al.(2006), Arefifar and Xu(2009)].
We show how our method is successful in tracking the voltage stability index on
a load point at the transmission level. In addition, given growing concerns about
the security vulnerabilities of network-connected control systems in the distribution
grid, we show, through an example, how our Thevenin estimation can be useful to
detect specific types of cyber-attacks in a distribution substation. Specifically, in
this chapter, we discuss the detection of certain types of reconnaissance activity over
SCADA network by attackers—that is, subtle probes and manipulation of network-
connected substation components by an attacker to test degree of access and possible
broader physical impact on the distribution grid.
Fault Localization: PMU-based fault detection and localization is an active area
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of research. For example, Ardekanian et al., [Ardakanian et al.(2017)] exploit PMU
data to detect and localize a change in the admittance matrix of a power grid. Zhou et
al., [Zhou et al.(2017)] use PMU measurements for event detection in the distribution
grid with partial information. Our previous work [Jamei et al.(2017b)] proposes a hier-
archical architecture as the host for event detection rules in distribution system using
PMU data when scarce measurements are available. Farajollahi et al., [Farajollahi
et al.(2018)] use distribution level PMUs for general event detection and localization
by generating an equivalent circuit so that the event can be represented by the voltage
and current phasors.
Event detection by itself is necessary but insufficient most of the times and it is
important for the grid operators to have knowledge about the source of the event,
to be able to locate a faulty section for isolation and service restoration. Tackling
the localization problem becomes challenging when one considers in a regime where
the sensors are insufficient to have observability, which is usually the case in the
distribution feeders. This regime is important in general in an adversarial setting
where data injection attacks can leave operators with few trustworthy sensors [Kim
and Poor(2011)]. In this case, gaining information from a subset of sensors on what
is plausible can be very useful in identifying data stealth attack since all subsets of
sensors must agree on a common version of the facts.
Zhu et al., [Zhu et al.(1997)] propose an automated fault localization and diagnosis
for distribution grids. Using measurements from the substation, the method first find
a set of plausible locations for the fault. During the diagnosis, the set of possiblities are
ranked for the operator. The effect of the DC componenet in the phsor data and how it
can affect momentary fault localization process is invetsigate in the work by Min and
Santoso [Min and Santoso(2017)]. Kahyap et al., [Kashyap et al.(2015)] implement a
fault location and isolation algorithm in a distributed fashion, where the focus is put
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on the communication network. Lee [Lee(2014)] uses PMU voltage data to search for
a fault in a radial network in a timely manner. A graph marking approach is taken
by Dzafic et al., [Dzafic et al.(2018)] to spot the location of a fault. There are also
a number of non-parametric methods for fault localization that use spatio-temporal
patterns of the measurements. For example, Jian et al., [Jiang et al.(2014)] extract
the time-frequency features of frequency and voltage from a dictionary by matching
pursuit [Mallat and Zhang(1993)], which is then followed by a clustering method for
fault detection. Borghetti et al., [Borghetti et al.(2008)] perform wavelet analysis
on the voltage waveform generated during a fault-induced transients to obtain the
location of a fault in the distribution network. While the exploitation of temporal
patterns helps in the localization, they do not provide an understanding on how the
performance is affected by the grid parameters and the sensor deployment. In this
work we ignore temporal features (which can be always included) and take inspiration
from Brahma’s work [Brahma(2011)] in using pre and post fault measurements along
with the admittance/impedance matrix for fault localization.
Using a statistical approach, we first improve upon Brahma’s method and study
the fault localization problem with measurements that are too scarce for observability
(we refer to it as the under-sampled grid regime). Our main contribution is to show
that in an under-sampled grid faults can be resolved reliably at level of clusters that
typically form connected sub-graphs. These clusters depend both on the properties of
grid admittance matrix as well as the placement of the sensors. As a figure of merit,
the cluster level fault localization resolution can measured in terms of the maximum
size of all clusters in which the graph is divided. Leveraging the insights from our
analysis we propose a placement strategy that achieves the highest localization res-
olution over the grid, by clustering the graph in a number of connected components
equal to the number of measurements, with clusters sizes as even as possible. In this
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section of the chapter we also compare our method with [Brahma(2011)] to better
highlight the benefits of our statistical approach, and showcase its application in the
forensic analysis of cyber-physical attacks to a distribution Fault Location, Isolation,
and Service Restoration (FLISR) system [Uluski(2012)]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the connection between the graph clustering and fault localization resolution
is new. However, we would like to acknowledge the graph clustering works in the
transmission grid (see e.g., [Wang et al.(2010)], [Sanchez-Garcia et al.(2014)]), in a
different context (not for fault localization). The results of this research is presented
in:
1.2 Part II-Coordinated Security-Constrained Scheduling of Power and Gas Grid:
There has been a significant growth in the share of gas-fired generators (especially
combined-cycle plants) for electricity production. The result of this trend is a strong
coupling between two of the largest infrastructures in a way that operation of one
can directly affect the other [Liu et al.(2009), Urbina and Li(2007)]. This becomes
even more important in the future, considering that expected gas-fired generation is
expected to increase by 230% by 2030 [Gruenspecht(2010)].
This issue is not just confined to the normal operation of the two grids. In fact,
coupling becomes more problematic when a contingency occurs in one, and affects
the other. Therefore, any security-constrained analysis should consider the inter-
dependency between the coupled systems. Chapter 5 has been dedicated to address
these issues and to present a coordinated methodology for secure scheduling of the
power and the gas grid [Jamei et al.(2018b)].
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1.2.1 Prior Work and Contributions
Interest in the coupling between the natural-gas and electric grids is relatively
recent. The aspects of this interdependence that have been explored in the literature
are briefly reviewed next. An early contribution is [Liu et al.(2009)] in which the
authors have formulated an electric grid Unit Commitment (UC) problem including
the natural gas grid constraints. The optimization is solved from an electric utility
perspective, but neither the co-optimization aiming to reach an Optimal Gas Flow
(OGF) and Optimal Power Flow (OPF) was considered nor the coordinated N-1
contingency analysis.
The focus of [Damavandi et al.(2011)] is incorporating a quasi dynamic model for
the gas grid in the UC problem. In [Qadrdan et al.(2014)], deterministic and stochas-
tic operating strategies are proposed to deal with an integrated gas and electricity
network under wind power forecast uncertainties. The authors in [Correa-Posada and
Sanchez-Martin(2014)] present a security-constrained optimal power and natural gas
flow. However, the spinning and non-spinning reserves, that are critical in studies
concerning gas-fired generators, are not considered. Also, the contingency analysis
is limited to the N-1 gas pipeline contingency. The authors in the paper simulate
only the contingencies for the pipelines in a loop, so that the grid stays connected
even after losing a pipeline. The issue is that the gas grid is largely radial, with
very few loops, and clearly the standard N-1 analysis is not well matched to radial
pipelines systems. The cascading effects of the gas-fired generators on the pressure
fluctuations in the gas network is investigated in [Chertkov et al.(2015b), Chertkov
et al.(2015a)]. Different coordination scenarios of gas and electric grid are proposed
in [Zlotnik et al.(2017)], using new methods to control gas flow dynamics to schedule
the day-ahead generators dispatch and compressors operation.
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The contributions in this work are as follows: First, a unified formulation for
Gas and Electric Grid Coordinated Unit Commitment (GECUC) is presented that
includes the spinning and non-spinning reserves, and deals with the non-linearity
of the gas grid constraints to transform the problem into a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP). Also, a coordinated N-1 generator contingency analysis is presented
that finds the contingency dispatch for the gas wells, storage, and generators when a
generator is lost.
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Part I
Cyber-Physical Security of Power
Distribution Grid
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CHAPTER 2
MICRO SYNCHROPHASOR-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION IN
AUTOMATED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS: TOWARDS CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
Electric power distribution systems are undergoing many technological changes
and concerns are surfacing on possible additional vulnerabilities. Resilient cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) in general must leverage state measures and operational
models that interlink the physical and the cyber assets that compose them, to assess
the global state. In this chapter we describe a viable process of abstraction to obtain
this holistic system state exploration tool, through the analysis of data from Micro
Phasor Measurement Units (µPMUs) combined with the monitoring of Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) traffic, and using semantics to interpret
these data that expresses the specific system physical and operational constraints in
both cyber and physical realms. We then formulate anomaly detection rules for this
architecture that looks into the µPMU data at different levels of aggregation to filter
out anamolous chunks of data for further analysis in order to distinguish between a
normal or a malicious anomaly.
2.1 Micro Synchrophasor Data: A Game Changer?
We believe deploying µPMUs can significantly increase the detection and classi-
fication capabilities of distribution operators. Many of the cyber-attacks aiming to
cause changes in the physical layer leave footprints or anomalies in the µPMU mea-
surements, such as voltage sags and swells, change of power flow direction, and electric
current events. Our basic idea is utilizing the µPMU measurements to correlate the
observed state of the system and the set of detected events through µPMU to form
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building blocks for the estimation of the grid security status. The knowledge about
the system topology and operation provides the rules to check the compliance of the
events seen in the µPMU measurements and in the network traffic, with the normal
behavior of the system, with some level of certainty.
While ADMS and in particular SCADA have potential existing security flaws
due to the use of traditional and outdated security measured, µPMUs, as a new
measurement device, are designed having modernized and advanced security practices
in mind. As the first step, they are placed on a separate network from SCADA, and are
designed to be read-only devices, and to communicate over secure protocols. However,
even if some of the µPMUs are compromised, since they only provide measurements
(in spite of SCADA, which also controls the devices and switches), many of the bad
data detection techniques (e.g. [Kim and Poor(2011)]) can be used to remove the false
data unless the number of compromised devices is large enough that data injection
attack is lost in the noise. In this regard, the optimally-placed µPMUs can not only
detect the bad data injection in SCADA meters but also can be used to identify the
bad data injection attack on a subset of µPMUs. To illustrate the use of µPMU data
in event detection and classification, we offer next an example based on the real data.
Specifically, on April-16-2015 a power quality event was captured by the µPMUs
installed at the partner utility grid shown in Fig. 2.1.1. The µPMUs data showed
that a voltage sag occurred, impacting all the µPMUs placed on two separate feeders.
The voltage and current phasor profiles during the event can be seen in Fig. 2.1.2a,
2.1.2b, respectively. Different hypotheses can be formulated about what caused the
voltage sag to happen, for example a local or remote transmission or distribution
level fault, with a possible protection operation ensuing. Given the brevity of the
event, it is extremely unlikely that SCADA data would have captured the sags. But
the enormous potential benefit of µPMU data in assessing security threats is best
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Figure 2.1.1: Partner Utility Distribution Grid One-Line Diagram
illustrated by the ability they offered to identify the likely source of the problem.
From Fig. 2.1.2a, 2.1.2b it is apparent that the severity of voltage sag is similar
for the µPMUs on both circuits at the same voltage level. In addition, all the µPMUs
captured the voltage sag simultaneously.
A distribution level fault at one feeder causing the simultaneous transients that
is transferred through sub-transmission to the other feeder is plausible only if the
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Figure 2.1.2: (a) Captured Voltage Sag by µPMUs, (b) Captured Current Phasor
during Voltage Sag by µPMUs
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transmission grid is not stiff with respect to transients happening at the distribution
feeders, which is usually not the case. Even if this is the case, the captured severity
would be more significant on the feeder that the fault happened compared to the
other that is not confirmed by the data. Another hypothesis is spreading of voltage
sag through the closed Normally Open (N.O.) breakers to the other feeder. This is
not corroborated by the data because the N.O. breaker between left and right side
are secondary action, which means another breaker should first clear the fault and
then this switch is closed to feed the healthy part of the grid. In that case, the sag is
already over when the switch gets closed. Even if the attacker tries to close the switch
before the fault clearance, the sag is transferred with a delay and different severity and
shape to the other side. The transmission level event is the most plausible scenario,
as it was visualized concurrently at all the two separate feeders, and is consistent with
the µPMU data.
2.2 All-embracing IDS Framework: How to Utilize All the Resources?
The analysis of this event revealed the ability of the µPMUs to capture the foot-
prints of a grid anomaly that led to physical impact. Based on this analysis we believe
that this new rich source of data, combined with knowledge of the grid configuration
and operations, allows to reason about different hypotheses and establish the likely
cause of an event in a way that would not have been possible using SCADA data
or network traffic alone. In addition, it is worth mentioning that, depending on the
type of events, some signatures would be more indicative than others of the situa-
tion. In the example we offered what the µPMU data cannot do is to clarify further
what happened at transmission level, where we have neither observations nor detailed
knowledge of the configuration and operations.
The abstraction of our µPMU-Based Intrusion Detection System (µPMU-IDS)
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Figure 2.2.1: The Hierarchical IDS Framework Includes: Local (Node Next to Each µPMU
(?) and Packet Sniffer), and Central IDS.
architecture is shown in Fig. 2.2.1. In this figure, local and central IDS form the
two levels of IDS data processing, respectively. The correlation of the different data
sources including the real-time µPMU measurements at multiple sites, and monitored
SCADA traffic are checked at the central level constantly to draw conclusions about
the security state of the grid, while the algorithms at the local level focus on the data
coming from each individual sensor irrespective to the others to find anomalies. In
Section 2.2, we provide an example that illustrates how our data analytics differ from
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the standard network intrusion detection system.
The µPMU-IDS is designed to be scalable by partitioning the security rules hi-
erarchically. The rules are established based on the physical constraints implied by
the Physics of the grid in addition to the common cyber inspection in the computer
networks security. The filters used in µPMU-IDS generalize and automate the pro-
cess of hypothesis testing that we illustrated in the example we offered before, also
utilize the SCADA packets, and are based on encoding the semantics of the rules in
a decision tree that can be inspected automatically by the µPMU-IDS components.
The µPMU-IDS is an incarnation of the Bro Network Security Monitor framework
[Paxson(1999)]. Functionally, the Bro Network Security Monitor is the “glue” that
binds passive SCADA system state observations, results leveraged from µPMU data
archiving and analysis tools, and results obtained from circuit analysis activities.
Output from the Bro framework will be in the form of predefined software events
that can be customized to interact with commercial substation control systems.
Interestingly, the µPMU-IDS rules pertaining the physical state emulate the be-
havior of an expert in the field looking at the logged data. Even without cyber security
concerns this effort is important to address the big data issue, arising from the large
amount of sensors and controllers placed on the grid, which would overwhelm the
operators.
What Happens at Local and Central IDS Nodes?
Prior to forwarding the information for its aggregation, that data from each µPMU
(marked together with green star in Fig. 2.2.1) and SCADA packet sniffer are ana-
lyzed by an IDS node that executes local rules. Such rules inspect for the signatures
of anomalies in the phasor data streams of the corresponding µPMU and cyber pack-
ets. The rules on the µPMU data inspect the anomalies in the voltage magnitude,
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estimated grid frequency, current magnitude, active and reactive power. In addition,
the rules utilize the deviation from the steady-state Kirchhoff and Ohm’s law as an
indicator of transient behavior and possible changes in the physical parameters of the
grid. The formal description of these rules are presented in the following sections.
Their specific characteristic is that the analysis is agnostic of the cyber-physical in-
frastructure configuration, which means that these particular data analytics can be
applied broadly.
As an example, in the left side of Fig. 2.2.2 we show how specific rules on the
voltage magnitude can convert the data into inferences on various possible hypotheses.
On the left side of Fig. 2.2.2, the data are first classified depending on the deviation
from the nominal voltage and event time duration values. The way that some of the
analysis on the µPMU data lead to the selection of different hypotheses on some of
the voltage events in the local IDS is shown in the right side of Fig. 2.2.2.
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Figure 2.2.2: Decision Region and Hypotheses of the Voltage Magnitude Events in the
First Stage of the Local IDS.
The chunks of data containing the event, along with a description of the analysis
performed at the local level, are then collected via µPMU Data Collectors (UDCs)
and Packet Sniffer Data Collectors (PSDCs) and reported to the central nodes. The
analysis performed by these nodes that are higher in the hierarchy fuses the µPMUs
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measurements and the monitored SCADA traffic to infer the status of the system,
taking into account the cyber-physical infrastructure configuration. For example, if
the interruption is detected, the bidirectional fault detectors that should see the fault
must be checked to unveil a possible spoofing attack. The duration of the interruption
can also be compared with the protective load breaker time of operation to determine
if the breaker has tripped on time.
An example of an attack scenario is now outlined to demonstrate the hypotheses
and process formulated in this work, and tested using the µPMUs and SCADA pack-
ets. This example also clarifies how the SCADA commands, along with the µPMU
data are leveraged in the anomaly detection. In the test case shown in Fig. 2.2.1, a
short circuit fault happens on the line connecting bus 5 to 7. In its normal operation,
a protection algorithm in substation 1 will detect the fault and use the relay on bus-1
breaker to deenergize the left feeder, at which point the load breakers placed on line
5-7 will receive a command to isolate the fault and finally energy will be restored to
the healthy part of the feeder, by closing the circuit breaker at bus 1. Assume that
a knowledgeable attacker has gained access to the network and the IP address of the
substation controller. For instance, in a first scenario, the attacker could stage a Man-
in-the-Middle attack jamming the command of the controller to the relay intended to
open the circuit breaker. A second possible scenario is that the attacker changes the
firmware of the relay at bus 1 (as in the Ukraine attack case [cbc news Technology
and Science(2016)]) and prevent it from tripping. The local IDSs, monitoring for
anomalies in the data from the µPMUs on the left feeder, will detect a transient and
alert the central IDS by sending the data through the UDC1 (see Fig. 2.2.1). The
packets sniffed by network taps placed on the links that connect the substation to
the relays operating the switches at bus 1 and line 5-7, are also sent to central IDS
from the sniffers through the PSDC1. Depending on the location of the sniffers, the
28
analysis of the packets could reveal the man-in-the-Middle attack, corroborating the
anomaly detected from the µPMU. If not, the µPMU will still indicate that the fault
is not cleared, in spite of the opening command having been issued, revealing an at-
tack either to the relay in bus 1 firmware, like in the aforementioned second scenario,
or the other possible attack mentioned as the first scenario that is launched after the
sniffer. Notice that the latter would not be detectable from the packet analysis only.
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CHAPTER 3
ANOMALY DETECTION USING OPTIMALLY-PLACED µPMU SENSORS IN
DISTRIBUTION GRIDS
In this chapter, focusing on µPMU data, we propose a set of analytics and sensor
fusion primitives for the detection of abnormal behavior in the control perimeter. Due
to the key role of the µPMU devices in our architecture, an optimal µPMU placement
with limited number of sensors is also described that finds the best location of the
devices with respect to our rules. The effectiveness of the proposed methods are
tested through the synthetic and real µPMU data. The following notations are used
throughout the rest of the chapter:
j Imaginary unit.
IN N ×N identity matrix.
AT ,A∗, Transpose, conjugate,
AH and conjugate transpose of matrix A.
||A||, ||A||F 2-norm and F-norm of matrix A.
1m×n m× n size matrix with entries 1.
A† Pseudo-inverse of matrix A.
⊗ Kronecker product.
The algorithms for anomaly detection applied next to each µPMU sensor are
referred to as “local rules” and those that aggregate readings of multiple µPMUs
are referred as “central rules”. The design of these rules are in compliance with
the architecture presented in Figure. 2.2.1 as the local rules would sit in the local
IDSs and central rules would be hosted at the central IDS. For large grid sizes, the
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aggregation can occur in multiple steps, where mid-level stages analyze part of the
data and forward them upward.
The suite of algorithms that are proposed for the µPMU-IDS layers have the
following advantages in comparison to the present state of the art: (1) due to the
near-real-time analysis, analytic results can be used to prioritize the traffic flow from
the lower to higher layer, thus pushing forward reports of anomalies faster than data
that do not raise a flag and need to simply be accrued for historical purposes; (2) it
employs three-phase distribution grid equations rather than the more commonly-used
positive sequence solution, thus avoiding the errors arising due to poor modeling; (3)
a quasi steady-state condition is considered as the normal regime of operation rather
than the idealistic steady-state, which assumes there is no frequency drift. These
modeling aspects are clarified in our discussion next.
3.1 The µPMU Data in a Distribution Grid
Fig. 3.1.1 shows the pi model of a distribution line that connects bus m to n.
Assuming normal conditions, the µPMUs are designed to capture samples of the
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Figure 3.1.1: pi Model of a Distribution Line
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three phase voltage phasor, which is denoted by v[k] ∈ C3×1, and of the current
phasor i[k] ∈ C3×1 in specific sites of a distribution grid. Next we apply Kirchhoff’s
and Ohm’s law for a three-phase line in a quasi steady-state condition.
A well-known fact from signals and systems theory is that the relationship between
voltage and current through a passive circuit with a certain admittance matrix can be
represented as a multiplication in the frequency domain and as a convolution in the
time domain. Because the circuit is three phase, these will be represented by a Multi-
Input Multi-Output system. This fact also holds for the phasor of the signals. We
first define ymn(t) and y
sh
mn(t) to denote the time domain equivalents of the matrices
Y mn(f + f0) and Y
sh
mn(f + f0), respectively, where f0 is the main frequency of the
grid. In discrete time, the convolution relationship is as follows:
imn[k] =
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]vm[k − r]− ymn[r]vn[k − r] (3.1.1)
where ymn[r] = ymn[r] + y
sh
mn[r] and it is assumed that y
sh
mn[r] and ymn[r] are the
samples of yshmn(t) ? h(t) and ymn(t) ? h(t), respectively, and have finite support N
and are causal1.
Next, the form of this relationship during the quasi steady-state is shown, since
the steady-state in reality never happens, which in turn represents the governing
equations during a regime of operation that is referred to as “normal”.
The fundamental frequency of the voltage and current signals are always varying,
even in a normal state (although slowly and over a very small range), because of load-
1h(t) denotes the low-pass filter implemented in the µPMU to extract the base-band signal
and H(f) is its corresponding frequency response. It should be noted that the outputs of µPMU,
and their corresponding functions, are not the exact phasors if the bandwidth of the signal (volt-
age/current) is greater than 2f0, and are aliased. However, what we are interested in is to track any
data abnormality (instead of the exact grid state during the event). Therefore, as long as it is not
suppressing the anomaly, having aliasing is not an issue for our rules.
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generation imbalances, active power demand interactions, large generators inertia,
and the automatic speed controllers of the generators [Phadke and Thorp(2008)].
The effect observable is a change of grid operation regime from steady-state to quasi
steady-state. The off-nominal frequency therefore affects the phase angle captured by
phasor measurement devices. To highlight that mathematically, the phasor readings
vm[k] and imn[k] are decomposed as follows:
vm[k] = vˆm[k]e
jβm[k]k, imn[k] = iˆmn[k]e
jβm[k]k (3.1.2)
where vˆm[k] is the voltage phasor that is observed at nominal frequency, and iˆmn[k]
is the current phasor after removing the exponential term due to the off-nominal
frequency at bus m, βm[k], that represents the (time-varying) drift in the frequency
induced by the above-mentioned reasons.
Considering the Discrete Time Fourier Transform, we have:
Y mn(f + f0)H(f) = rect(Tsf)Ts
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]e
−j2pirTsf (3.1.3)
where 1
Ts
= 120Hz is the µPMU output rate, and H(f) is the frequency response of
the filter h(t). Introducing:
Y mn(f0, k) ,
1
Ts
Y mn
(
f0 +
βn[k]
2piTs
)
H
(
βn[k]
2piTs
)
, (3.1.4)
we have that
Y mn(f0, k) =
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]e
−jβn[k]r, (3.1.5)
and similarly Y mn(f0, k) =
∑N−1
r=0 ymn[r]e
−jβm[k]r.
During the quasi steady-state the variations in vˆm[k] and βm[k] are negligible over
a window of N samples, which means vˆm[k−r] ≈ vˆm[k] and βm[k−r] ≈ βm[k]. Using
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this approximation, (3.1.1) can be re-written as:
imn[k] ≈
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]vˆm[k]e
jβm[k](k−r)
− ymn[r]vˆn[k]ejβn[k](k−r)
= Y mn(f0, k)vm[k]− Y mn(f0, k)vn[k]
(3.1.6)
Equation (3.1.6) is Ohm’s law in the phasor domain and is the cornerstone for our
transients detection algorithm derived in the following section. The analysis above
explains through (3.1.6) why in the phasor domain, the equivalent effect of the quasi-
steady state conditions is that the admittances (3.1.4) fluctuate. The effect is usually
modest, because β[k] is small. However, during a severe transient or frequency in the
order of 10Hz the relationship (3.1.6) with the matrices in (3.1.4) does not hold, due
to the manifestation of the full dynamic behavior in (3.1.1).
In the following, the “local” and “central” rules are defined leveraging these
insights and the knowledge about power system operation. Note that our rules
are set up in a way that all the local engines are agnostic about Y mn(f0, k) and
Y mn(f0, k), and the sensor siting. However, it is assumed that the central engine
knows Y shmn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 and Y mn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 for the lines within its monitoring re-
gion and the difference from (3.1.4) is treated as equivalent to noise in the observation
model. Therefore, when dealing with central rules, we will simply use Y shmn and Y mn
to refer to Y shmn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 and Y mn(f0, k)|β[k]=0.
3.2 Data Analysis
Our rules monitor for abnormalities in the following quantities 1) voltage mag-
nitude, 2) current magnitude, 3) active power, 4) reactive power, 5) instantaneous
frequency drift, and 6) the validity of quasi steady-state equations. The “local rules”
just require the stream of phasors from a single µPMU, while the “central rules”
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combine multiple streams across µPMUs.
3.2.1 Local Rules
The “local rules” are applied at the lowest layer of the “anomaly detection archi-
tecture”, and run on systems adjacent to the µPMUs. Their common feature is that
they require no specific prior knowledge of the grid network parameters.
Table 3.1: Voltage Magnitude Anomalies
anomaly signature 2
voltage sag 0.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 0.9, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
voltage swell 1.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 1.8, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
interruption |v| < 0.1, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
sustained interruption |v| < 0.1, τ > 60s
undervoltage 0.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 0.9, τ > 60s
overvoltage 1.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 1.8, τ > 60s
3.2.1.1 Voltage Magnitude Changes
The magnitude of the voltage varies within a small range that power quality standards
enforce during the normal operations [515(2009)]. Therefore, any large deviation from
that range indicates an abnormal condition. Table. 3.1 lists the anomalies that can
be observed in the voltage magnitude labeled by their severity and duration, denoted
by |v| and τ , respectively.
2The voltage magnitude is in p.u.
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3.2.1.2 Current Magnitude, Active, and Reactive Power Changes
Even when the voltage magnitude is within the safe range discussed previously,
changes in active and reactive power can still happen due to the change of the load,
affecting current magnitude and the phase angle between current and voltage pha-
sors. Therefore, it is also of interest to track fast-changes of these quantities using
the method described in Section. 3.2.3.
The three phase apparent power can simply be computed as:
Smn[k] = Pmn[k] + jQmn[k] = diag(vm[k])i
∗
mn[k] (3.2.1)
where Pmn[k] and Qmn[k] are the three-phase active and reactive powers, respectively.
Note that for the sake of tracking a power flow change in the distribution grid, tracking
the active power and reactive power is preferable over monitoring the phase angle
difference, since the resistance of the lines is not negligible, and therefore the angle
difference does not necessarily indicate the direction of the power flow. We observed
this fact in our partner utility grid, when the voltage phase angle at one end of the
line was less than the angle at the other end, though the direction of the power flow
was not from the higher angle to the lower one.
Because physical changes in this class of data on the distribution grid can be
potentially indicative of negative behavior, it is important to determine the direction
(upward trend, downward trend or oscillation) of the change.
The anomalies related to fast changes are labeled in this class of data with surge,
drop, and oscillation for increasing, decreasing, and swinging trends respectively by
estimating the slope of the signal around the time of change.
While we have primarily introduced fast state changing events in both the dynamic
and transient realms, we must also consider events in the steady state time frame,
slower changing yet also potentially critical. An example of this could include a
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line rating or transformer load being slowly but consistently exceeded leading to
accelerated failure. During the quasi steady-state, the three phase current phasor
magnitude flowing in each line, i.e., |imn[k]|, should be less than or equal the line
rated current, |imn|max. This constraint is imposed as feeder limit, and the violation
is flagged as overcurrent.
3.2.1.3 Instantaneous Frequency Changes
For a µPMU at bus m, we propose to estimate adaptively the instantaneous local
frequency deviation from the nominal frequency during the quasi-steady state, using
the approach for instance in [Xia and Mandic(2012)] that is tailored to three-phase
distribution lines, to isolate abnormal changes in the estimated frequency.
3.2.1.4 Quasi Steady-State Regime Validity
As previously noted, when the grid is not in the normal quasi steady-state conditions,
the relationship between voltage and the current phasors represents its full dynamic
behavior, i.e. the grid is no longer well-approximated by the set of memory-less
algebraic equations. Therefore, it is proposed to check the validity of the quasi steady-
state regime to flag the presence of transients in the grid. At the local engines, (3.1.6)
provides the basis for our rule. For the line in Fig. 3.1.1, assuming that a µPMU is
installed at bus m means that imn[k], and vm[k] are both available.
Let α[k] be the diagonal matrix such that voltage phasors of bus m and bus n,
connected via a power line, are related through:
vn[k] = α[k]vm[k], (3.2.2)
Defining:
R
(mn)
iv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
r=0
imn[k − r]vHm[k − r], (3.2.3)
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R(nm)vv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
r=0
vn[k − r]vHm[k − r], (3.2.4)
Assuming that α[k] remains constant over a window of M samples in the quasi-steady
state, one can write:
R(nm)vv [k] ≈ α[k]R(mm)vv [k] (3.2.5)
It can be assumed that the variation of Y mn(f0, k) is negligible over M samples in
normal operation and use (3.1.6) to write:
(
I3 −Y mn(f0, k) + Y mn(f0, k)α[k]
)R(mn)iv [k]
R(mm)vv [k]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(mn)
k
≈ 0
Proposition 1. Correlation matrix R
(mn)
k is approximately rank-1 during the quasi
steady-state.
Proof. During the quasi-steady state along a distribution line, the following assump-
tions hold with a very good approximation for r = 0, 1, ...,M − 1:
vˆm[k − r] ≈ vˆm[k], βm[k − r] ≈ βm[k] (3.2.6)
Therefore, we can write:
R(mm)vv [k] =
1
M − 1(vm[k]⊗ Em[k])(v
H
m[k]⊗ EHm[k])
=
1
M − 1(vm[k]v
H
m[k])⊗ (Em[k]EHm[k])
(3.2.7)
where Em[k] is defined as follows and represents the variations due to the off-nominal
frequency:
Em[k] = 13×1 ⊗
(
e−jβm[k](M−1) . . . e−jβm[k] 1
)
(3.2.8)
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which we can then write:
Em[k]E
H
m[k] = (13×111×3)⊗ (M) = M13×3 (3.2.9)
and therefore:
R(mm)vv [k] =
M
M − 1(vm[k]v
H
m[k])⊗ (13×3) (3.2.10)
which accordingly means that:
rank(R(mm)vv [k]) = rank(vm[k]v
H
m[k])× rank(13×3) = 1
Because:
rank(R
(mn)
k ) = rank((R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k )
we analyze the rank of (R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k here, where:
(R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k =(R
(mn)
iv [k])
HR
(mn)
iv [k]+
(R(mm)vv [k])
HR(mm)vv [k]
(3.2.11)
From the structure of (3.2.6) during the quasi-steady state, we have:
R
(mn)
iv [k] = Y˜mn(f0, k)R
(mm)
vv [k]
Y˜mn(f0, k) = Y mn(f0, k)− Y mn(f0, k)diag(α[k])
(3.2.12)
Substituting (3.2.12) in (3.2.11), we have:
(R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k = (R
(mm)
vv [k])
HYmn(f0, k)R(mm)vv [k] (3.2.13)
where:
Ymn(f0, k) = Y˜Hmn(f0, k)Y˜mn(f0, k) + I
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Since the linear transformation of R(mm)vv [k] does not increase its rank and since it
has already been shown that R(mm)vv [k] is of rank-1 during the quasi-steady state, one
can conclude that:
rank(R
(mn)
k ) = rank((R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k ) ≤
rank(R(mm)vv [k])→ rank(R(mn)k ) = 1
(3.2.14)
Hence:
R
(mn)
k ≈ σ(mn)1 [k]u(mn)1 [k](ν(mn)1 [k])H →
R
(mn)
k (R
(mn)
k )
H ≈ (σ(mn)1 [k])2u(mn)1 [k](u(mn)1 [k])H
(3.2.15)
where σ
(mn)
1 is the largest singular value of R
(mn)
k , and u
(mn)
1 and ν
(mn)
1 are the cor-
responding left and right singular vectors to that, respectively. Deviation from this
subspace structure can indicate that the line is experiencing a transient. We can
automate the detection of anomaly using this criterion by computing the following
cost minimization and tracking the fast changes in x[k] for each incidental line to a
bus with µPMU:
x[k] = min
u
||(I6 − uuH)R(mn)k (R(mn)k )H ||F
s.t. ||u|| = 1
(3.2.16)
In other words, x[k] measures the size of the residual that R
(mn)
k has in the space
orthogonal to the optimal u, which should be zero in the quasi steady-state and non-
zero otherwise. Since it has already been shown that R
(mn)
k is of rank-1 during the
quasi steady-state, the left singular vector corresponding to the largest singular value
of R
(mn)
k is the only quantity of interest to compute the metric, instead of computing
all the singular vectors. Therefore, also owing it to the small size of the matrix, the
method is not computationally very expensive.
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To conclude the local rules, a flowchart of the analysis performed at the local
engine next to µPMU at bus m is presented in Fig. 3.2.1. At each instant of time,
the phasor readings are received by the local engine and the introduced metrics above
are calculated. The pre-processed data are then passed to the local rules to check for
any violation. A violation could be trespassing pre-defined limits (e.g., the voltage
magnitude rule, or maximum current magnitude limit) or fast changes in a metric with
smooth behavior during the normal condition (e.g., quasi steady-state validity rule).
Once a violation is found in one of the metrics, the start time is recorded. The search
for anomaly continues until no new violation is found for a certain window of time
(“Count1 > T1”), and that specifies the end time of the anomaly. The type of anomaly
is then determined based on the behavior of the data between the start time and the
end time (e.g., active power surge, voltage interruption,...). The start time, end time
and the anomaly label is then sent upstream for further analysis/visualization, and
the parameters are reset for next event. If the number of detected violations related
to a certain event passes a pre-defined threshold (“Count2 > T2”), the end time is
replaced with a “Persistent” label, and the results are sent to the central engine,
without waiting for the end of the event to arrive. The reason is to be able to inform
the operator about the anomaly in time, and not waiting too long before something
more damaging happens.
3.2.2 Central Rule
At higher levels of aggregation, the central engine in our case, the natural way
to relate the measurements is through the grid interconnection. For a grid with B
buses, let I[k] denote the vector of three-phase current injection phasors with size 3B,
and V[k] represent the vector of three-phase voltage phasor at all the buses, which
contains 3B elements. We define the measurement vector d[k] = (IT [k],VT [k])T .
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Figure 3.2.1: Local Engine Analysis Flowchart Next to µPMU at Bus m.
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During the steady-state, the following algebraic equation should hold:
Hd[k] = 0, H =
(
I3B −Y 3(B×B)
)
(3.2.17)
where Y is the admittance matrix of the grid that connects the current injection to
the bus voltages. During the quasi steady-state these equations are close to be homo-
geneous. Since the distribution grid is unbalanced, and the lines are not transposed
the set of equations that should be dealt with are three phase instead of working with
positive sequence [Kersting(2012)]. In this framework, we are also able to include the
laterals in the admittance matrix by putting the entries corresponding to the phases
that do not exist equal to zero.
It is assumed that H is known, K denotes the number of µPMUs that are available
and that each device has enough channels to measure the voltage and all incidental
current measurements of the bus on which it is placed. Therefore, having a µPMU
at bus m means that the entries in V[k] corresponding to vm[k] and entries in I[k]
corresponding to
∑
n:m∼n imn[k] are both available, where m ∼ n denotes that bus
m and n are connected through a line. Let T denote a matrix parsing the vector
d[k] into two parts corresponding to the unavailable measurements, du[k], and the
available measurements, da[k]:
T =
Tu
Ta
 → Td =
du
da
 , HTT = (Hu Ha) (3.2.18)
where K ′ = B −K and
Tu ∈ {0, 1}6(K′×B), Ta ∈ {0, 1}6(K×B) (3.2.19)
Tu and Ta here are block diagonal matrices of size 6(K
′ × B) and 6(K × B) with
entries equal to 0 or 1. The former is supposed to select the unavailable current and
voltage phasors by having entries equal to 1 at corresponding locations, and the latter
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is supposed to pick the available phasors. Since TTT = I, we can rewrite (3.2.17) as
follows:
Hudu[k] + Hada[k] = 0→ (3.2.20a)
Hada[k] = −Hudu[k]. (3.2.20b)
Let first assume that we have enough µPMUs that satisfy K > B
2
. Therefore, the
matrix Hu would be a tall matrix and has a left null-space. Premultiplying both sides
of (3.2.20b) by the projector on the left null-space of Hu, we have:
(I −HuH†u)Hada[k] = 0 (3.2.21)
because (I −HuH†u)Hu=0. The equality in (3.2.20b) only holds during the steady-
state (and for quasi steady-state with a good approximation), which means that
equation (3.2.21) is homogeneous only in the steady-state (nearly-homogeneous in the
quasi steady-state), and non-homogeneous otherwise. The following metric should,
therefore, be close to zero only during normal operation and if H is unchanged:
x[k] =
||(I −HuH†u)Hada[k]||22
||da[k]||22
(3.2.22)
However, in reality, the number of available µPMUs, K  B
2
. In this case, Hu is a fat
matrix and, in general, is of full row rank, which in turn means that (I −HuH†u)=0,
and our criterion becomes trivial. However, HuH
H
u has generally a high condition
number, due to the weak grid connectivity. Therefore, both sides of (3.2.20b) can
be projected on the subspace spanned by the left singular vector, denoted by uu,s
corresponding to the smallest singular value of Hu expecting that u
H
u,sHudu[k] to be
small. Accordingly, when the quasi steady-state is the regime of operation, i.e., when
the equality in (3.2.20b) holds, it is expected that the following function to be small
and to vary smoothly:
x[k] =
|uHu,sHada[k]|2
||da[k]||2 . (3.2.23)
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The exit from this behavior is then marked as an anomaly in the central engine and
x[k] is the quantity that is proposed to be tracked for fast changes for this purpose.
The flowchart for the central engine is similar to the one for local engine to some
extent except that all the µPMU readings are required to form the central metric, and
the results from the local analysis are received by the central engine, and the analysis
results from this stage are not shipped anywhere, and are ready to be displayed for
the operator.
3.2.3 Fast Change Detection Method
As explained above, some of the criteria defined in the local and central rules
require tracking fast changes in the quantities that are defined, because severe vari-
ations in x[k] are signatures of an anomaly. From real data and simulations we
have verified that variations in the mean value for these quantities during the quasi
steady-state regime are extremely smooth. This observation prompted us to consider
changes in their mean value as the common statistical trade-mark of anomalies in all
of these quantities and to use the sequential two-sided Cumulative Sum (CUSUM)
algorithm [Page(1954), Basseville et al.(1993)] as a heuristic. The use of this algo-
rithm amounts to approximating the samples, for all the aforementioned quantities,
as outcomes of a Gaussian non-zero mean process with independent observations.
Although the observations are in fact temporally correlated, our objective (i.e. fast
change detection in mean) justifies the relaxation that the random process has inde-
pendent observation samples. The algorithm decides between two hypotheses H0: no
change in the mean, or H1: change in the mean, at time k.
A change is detected when the decision function of CUSUM crosses a pre-defined
threshold. Therefore, choosing a proper threshold would be essential for practical
applications. In this sense, our intrusion detection architecture falls into “semi-
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supervised behavior-based detection” category, where a collection of real data points
containing a variety of anomalies are required to train the detector and find the proper
threshold in the learning phase. Several metrics are proposed to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the CUSUM. The “average run length” proposed in [Page(1954)] and the
“worst case detection delay” proposed in [Lorden(1971)] are the two most popular
ones. Having the approximation of a Gaussian distribution, these metrics can be
computed accordingly.
We expect to see multiple change points during an event. Detection of multiple
change points is achieved by resetting the decision functions and cumulative sums to
zero after the change is detected, and continuing the inspection of upcoming samples.
The fast change anomaly is completed if no new changes are detected for a defined
window of time.
3.3 Optimal µPMU Placement
In tandem with the anomaly detection, the criterion that was described for the
central engine can be the basis to determine an optimal placement for the µPMUs.
As it was mentioned, the challenge here is that we cannot feasibly nor practically
deploy µPMUs at all nodes in the distribution system, therefore we consider a limited
deployment, where K  B
2
.
Ideally, we want the matrix Hu to have a left null-space for the criterion in (3.2.23)
to be zero in the steady-sate. Considering the high condition number of HuH
†
u, a
reasonable approach to find the optimal configuration is to minimize the norm in
(3.2.23) over all the possible placement configurations. Let first rewrite the defined
metric in (3.2.23):
x[k] =
dHa [k]H
H
a uu,su
H
u,sHada[k]
||da||2 . (3.3.1)
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We desire our formulation to be only topology-dependent and not to be a function of
measurements. Therefore, the optimal placement problem is formulated as a min-max
optimization with the following structure:
Πopt = argmin
Π
λmax(W)
s.t.
(
Hu Ha
)
= H
(
TTu T
T
a
)
T = I2 ⊗ (Π⊗ I3),
W = HHa uu,su
H
u,sHa, [Π]i,j ∈ {0, 1}∑
j
[Π]i,j = 1,
∑
i
[Π]i,j = 1
(3.3.2)
Since λmax(W) = maxda[k]
dHa [k]Wda[k]
||da[k]||2 , essentially we are choosing a placement that
minimizes the maximum value that our objective function can take over possible set
of available measurement vectors da[k].
An exhaustive search is required to find the global optimum of the optimization
problem in (3.3.2), which is exponentially complex, and therefore does not scale well.
This becomes a barrier when the size of the grid is large, i.e., in most of the real grids.
Therefore, we propose to employ a “Greedy Search” as an alternative to reduce the
time complexity to polylog, while accepting to be near-optimal. The pseudo-code of
the employed greedy search is illustrated in Algorithm. 3.1.
3.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we first find the optimal placement for our µPMUs based on (3.3.2)
and then test the effectiveness of the proposed anomaly detection criteria through
simulated data and real data, provided from the µPMUs that are installed in our
partner utility medium voltage (12.47 kV) grid.
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Algorithm 3.1: Greedy Search Pseudo-Code for Anomaly Detection Opti-
mal µPMU Placement in Application.
Initialization
K := Number of µPMUs;
P := ∅, // Set of selected placement locations;
L := Set of candidate placement buses;
begin
for n=1..K do
Cost← inf;
for each l ∈ L do
P := P ∪ {l};
given P , calculate λmax(W);
if λmax(W) < Cost then
lopt ← l;
Cost← λmax(W);
P := P \ {l};
P := P ∪ {lopt};
L := L \ {lopt};
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3.4.1 Synthetic Data
The IEEE-34 bus test case [Group(2010)] is simulated using the time-domain
simulation environment of DIgSILENT [Manual and PowerFactory(2009)] that deals
with differential equations rather than memory-less equations. The sampling rate is
selected to be equal to the sampling rate of the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC)
in a real µPMU, which is 512 × 60 Hz =30720 samples per sec.. We then processed
these time-domain data through our phasor estimation algorithm, that emulates a
two-cycle, P-class algorithm based on the IEEE C37.118.1 [for Power Systems Work-
ing Group(2011)] producing phasor samples at a rate of 120 Hz. The single-line
diagram of the test case is shown in Fig. 3.4.1. This case includes single-phase later-
als, voltage regulators, and untransposed lines, which all are modeled exactly in our
admittance matrix.
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Figure 3.4.1: IEEE 34-Bus Test Feeder Single-Line Diagram
Table. 3.2 compares the objective value for a random placement, “Greedy Search”
and “Exhaustive Search”, and the time complexity of each solver, assuming that
K = 3 µPMUs are available. The objective value of the “Greedy Search” and the
“Exhaustive Search”, and the set of the selected buses are close to each other, while
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Table 3.2: IEEE-34 Case Optimal µPMU Placement Result for K = 3
Random Greedy Exhaustive
Optimum Cost 1.7085 0.51477 0.51477
Buses with µPMUs {1,3,9} {7,19,31} {9,19,31}
Run Time – 2.84 s 290.266 s
the run time of the “Greedy Search” is 102.206 times faster. Hence, the “Greedy
Search” can be a very good choice to solve our optimal placement problem.
As expected, the placement rule tries to scatter the available µPMUs all over the
grid, in order to achieve the maximum possible coverage.
In order to investigate how the time complexity grows, and also analyze the results
of the placement criterion, the 123 standard test case in [Group(2010)] was used,
considering 20 µPMUs available (i.e., K = 20). Without loss of generality, the 123
test feeder was reduced to 70 buses to only include three-phase lines, and roll up all
the laterals (single-phase and two-phase lines). The reasoning behind this reduction
is that visibility on the main feeder is more important for us than the the visibility
on the laterals, considering the limited number of µPMUs. Using a machine with
60 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4870 v2 @ 2.30GHz cores, it took 11.56 Sec for the
algorithm to place 20 µPMUs over 70 buses. Fig. 3.4.2 illustrates the location of
the optimally-placed µPMUs in the reduced grid. It can be observed from the figure
that the µPMUs are scattered over the grid to achieve the maximum sensitivity with
respect to different locations of anomalies.
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Figure 3.4.2: Optimally-Placed µPMUs on Reduced IEEE 123 Test Feeder.
3.4.1.1 Single-Line to Ground Fault-IEEE 34 Bus
In this simulation, the rules are tested for detecting anomaly with respect to a Single-
Line to Ground Fault (SLGF), which is a very common type of short-circuit fault in
the distribution grid. A SLGF was introduced on “Phase a” of line (25,26), which
then caused the fuse placed on the phase a of this line near bus 25 to melt down. Our
three µPMUs are placed on buses, 7, 19, and 31 based on the “greedy search” result
for the optimal placement criterion.
The results of the “voltage magnitude change” rule are shown in Fig. 3.4.3 for
µPMUs 7, and 19 for instance. Simply, the rule inspects the data for large deviations,
label them accordingly, and find the start time and the end time of the event, marked
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with blue and red stars.
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Figure 3.4.3: Voltage Magnitude Local Rule Result for SLGF.
Fig. 3.4.4 illustrates the metric value in (3.2.16) for the specified lines that is
inspected with M = 12 to check whether the grid is in the quasi steady-state or not.
The voltage and current data are first converted to per-unit system assuming Sb = 1
MVA. The start time of the detected changes are also marked, setting the CUSUM
detector parameters fixed in all the three local engines corresponding to each µPMU.
As it can be observed, there are two periods in which the grid manifests its dynamic:
the first one corresponds to the occurrence of the fault and the second matches with
the fuse meltdown. In addition, based on the severity of the transient that each
µPMU measures, the number of detected changes via CUSUM varies. In this case,
considering the location of the µPMUs and the location and type of the fault, the
most severe change appears in the metric corresponding to measurements from line
(19,20), while the changes in metric for line (31,32) is very small. Therefore, based on
the defined parameters on the detector, CUSUM finds quite a large number of change
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points in the former, while it is not set to be sensitive to the changes in the order that
appears in the latter. In fact, if the detector is set to be too sensitive, it can increase
“false alarms” in the system. Also note that due to the two-cycle calculation of the
phasor, and use of M samples to calculate the correlation matrix, the event appears
and disappears with a systematic delay.
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Figure 3.4.4: Quasi Steady-State Validity Checking for SLGF.
The other local rules also capture the anomaly, though with different severity and
behavior (we just show some of the results here for lack of space). In fact, many of the
local rules may detect the same event, though some rules are more informative than
others depending on the cause. Each triggered rule reports a start and an end time for
the event. Storing these time-tags for eventful segments of data helps understanding
their relationship.
The metric defined for our central engine is also illustrated in Fig. 3.4.5. The
delay in appearing and disappearing of the event in here is solely due to the two-cycle
phasor calculation.
It should be noted that the value of the metric in (3.2.23) during the quasi steady-
state is highly dependent on the number of µPMUs and the topology of the grid that
together determine the structure of Hu and Ha. However, the best placement of the
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Figure 3.4.5: Central Rule Inspection for SLGF.
µPMUs for a certain topology and number of µPMUs that makes the metric to be
as close as possible to zero, returns a certain objective value that can be used as the
baseline to determine what is a normal value for x[k] and what would be an anomaly.
3.4.1.2 Feeder Reconfiguration-IEEE 34 Bus
In this case, it is assumed that there is a normally-open line that connects node 13 to
21. This line is closed as part of a hypothetical feeder reconfiguration scheme when the
line 13-15 is opened. We run the simulation for 1.5 sec, and the feeder reconfiguration
happens at t = 0.75 sec. Fig. 3.4.6 shows the voltage phasor magnitude and the metric
related to the quasi steady-state validity check at the local level for the reconfiguration
event. As it can be seen, the event does not trigger any anomaly in the voltage
phasor magnitude. For example, if we wanted to solely rely on the raw phasor data
coming from µPMU 7 and not checking other metrics, this event would have been
missed because the current phasors measured by this µPMU also do not see significant
change, mainly because the downstream load of bus 7 has not changed. However,
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checking the validity of quasi steady-state for line 6-7 using the measured phasor
data by µPMU 7 clearly reveals the existence of an anomaly in the system.
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Figure 3.4.6: Voltage Magnitude and Quasi Steady-State Validity Check Rule for
Feeder Reconfiguration.
3.4.1.3 Case Study on Data Injection Attack
We illustrate here the resilience of the architecture to data injection attacks. For
this purpose, three data attack scenarios are investigated happening concurrently
with the SLGF event discussed previously. We consider the case of the attacker
manipulating the data of µPMU 7 in the first case, and µPMU 19 in the second case,
and finally µPMU 7 and 19 at the same time in the third case on their way to the
central engine. In all cases the data injected are a replay of the last available data set
before the anomaly starts. Setting the change detector parameters fixed for all the
three cases, Fig. 3.4.7 shows, for each case, the central rule and the start time of the
detected changes. As can be seen, since µPMU 19 is playing an important role for this
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event, having µPMU 7 compromised will not affect our central rule significantly (case-
1). However, when the µPMU 19 is compromised, the number of detected changes
reduce significantly (case-2), and when both µPMU 7 and 19 are compromised and
the only healthy data is coming from µPMU 31, the detector does not pick any fast
changes based on the set parameters. This also reveals the importance of tuning the
detector thresholds to have a certain “false alarm,” while maximizing the “detection”
probability. We wish to remark that in all the three cases, the local analytics that
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Figure 3.4.7: Central Rule for SLGF with Manipulated µPMU Data.
directly draw data from µPMUs will still flag the alarm, so buffering locally at the
site of the event these data can be an important way of helping understand what
communications were compromised in an ex-post analysis.
3.4.1.4 Optimal versus Non-Optimal Placement
As it was mentioned, the placement criterion tries to scatter the available µPMUs
over the grid to achieve the maximum coverage, and therefore make the central rule
more sensitive to anomalies.
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In order to compare the performance of an optimal versus non-optimal placement,
a load loss event is created on bus 24 of IEEE-34 test case at t = 0.4s. The µPMUs are
placed based on the random placement and greedy search result given in Table. 3.2,
corresponding to non-optimal and optimal placement, respectively. Fig. 3.4.8 shows
the central metric for these two cases. Since the relative change is what matters to our
detector, the metrics corresponding to two placements are brought on the same scale.
As it can be observed, since the µPMUs in the random placement are concentrated at
a certain area, events like this would not be very pronounceable in the central metric,
which could possibly lead to a “false-negative”.
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Figure 3.4.8: Central Metric Change of a Load Loss Event; Optimal versus Non-
optimal Placement.
3.4.2 Real Data
Fig. 3.4.9 shows the abstract one-line diagram of the partner utility grid and
the location of the installed µPMUs. The installed µPMUs sample the voltage and
current with a rate of 512× 60 Hz, and output the estimated phasors at 120 Hz rate.
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These devices achieve an accuracy of 0.001 deg resolution for phasor angle, 0.0002%
for phasor magnitude, and 0.01% for Total Vector of Error (TVE) [Power Standards
Lab(2016)]. The two feeders here are connected through the subtransmission grid.
Subtransmission 
Grid
Feeder 1
Feeder 2
PV Site
µPMU 1 
µPMU 2 
µPMU 3 
Figure 3.4.9: Location of Installed µPMUs in Our Partner Utility Grid.
Fig. 3.4.10 shows the voltage magnitude change rule inspected on the data from
these µPMUs over a certain time. The results of the fast change inspection on the
current magnitude of phase a and instantaneous local frequency at the substation
bus of feeder 2 are also illustrated in Fig. 3.4.11(a) and Fig. 3.4.11(b), respectively.
Observing the results of the analysis, the DSO can deduce that the cause of the event
is most probably located on feeder 2. Also, from the pre- and post-anomaly value of
the current magnitude, the DSO can conclude that some of the loads on this feeder
tripped due to the voltage sag. We just showed the results from some of the rules due
to the space limit but other rules can also flag the existence of anomaly on feeder 2.
All the metrics introduced and tested above are designed considering the specifi-
cations of a distribution grid. It should be noted that not all the proposed methods
in the literature for transmission grid are applicable in the distribution side. For ex-
ample, the phase angle difference in the distribution grid is known to be much smaller
than that in the transmission level. Therefore, as opposed to transmission grid that
58
13:12:14 13:12:15
Time (PST, 05-Jan-2016)
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
Vo
lta
ge
 M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (p
.u.
)
PMU 1
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
13:12:14 13:12:15
Time (PST, 05-Jan-2016)
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
Vo
lta
ge
 M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (p
.u.
)
PMU 2
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
13:12:14 13:12:15
Time (PST, 05-Jan-2016)
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
Vo
lta
ge
 M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (p
.u.
)
PMU 3
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
No Detected Event! No Detected Event!
Three-Phase Voltage Sag!
Figure 3.4.10: Voltage Magnitude Change Rule for Real Data.
this metric would work well for event detection [Allen et al.(2014)], it might not be a
proper metric to look at in the distribution grid, since the signal to noise ratio might
be small. The example next illustrates how the voltage angle difference metric could
have failed if it was used as a “local rule”. Using the data from two µPMUs installed
at two ends of a line at a second utility grid (not the one in Fig. 3.4.9), the voltage
magnitude captured by the µPMU at one end of the line is shown in Fig. 3.4.12(a)
and the voltage phasor angle difference between the two µPMUs at two ends of the
line is shown in Fig. 3.4.12(b). As it can be observed, the important event in this
period corresponds to the two voltage sags. However, the angle difference shows a
significant number of spikes without clearly marking these two events with the same
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Figure 3.4.11: Fast Change Tracking of Current Phasor Magnitude and Bus Instan-
taneous Frequency Drift for Real Data.
significance. Passing this metric to our detector, we would pick too many fast changes
that do not represent any specific event of interest, which therefore means an increase
in the number of “false positives”. All streams of interest were examined during this
period, including both the active and reactive power, and all anomalies detected were
in agreement with those visible in Fig. 3.4.12(a).
3.4.2.1 Case Study-Robustness Against Volatility
The increasing presence of renewable resources, like wind and solar, in the distribution
grid may raise some concerns about the robustness of the proposed rules to “false
alarms” due to their inherent volatility. However, our method is based on an adaptive
estimation of the data mean using an exponential window and, as shown in the
following numerical example, this makes the algorithm capable to only pick the fast
changes over a very short period of time, while being insensitive when the rate of
change is in the same order of that of renewable resources fluctuations. To show it
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Figure 3.4.12: Voltage Phasor Angle Difference Between Two µPMUs at Distribution
Grid.
numerically, we refer to two real events captured by µPMU 2 in the grid in Fig.3.4.9.
Fig. 3.4.13(a) shows a dramatic change of about -18.25% over 9 seconds in the PV
site active power injection due to the cloud effects, and Fig. 3.4.13(b) shows a step
change in the active power after the PV site went out of service. Setting the detection
parameters to be the same for both events, it can be seen that the detector flags no
event for the first case and finds multiple of fast changes in the second. This is ideal
since the events of our interest in the this context are of the second type, which should
be discriminated from the normal quasi steady-state behavior in the first case.
Considering the existence of different types of loads in the distribution grid, the
detector should also be able to differentiate between possible normal fluctuations in
the load profile and those that are caused by a rare event. To show the performance
of CUSUM for this case, real data of a µPMU installed behind a building with a
non-linear load is used. As it can be seen in Fig. 3.4.14, the fast change tracker of the
current magnitude does not pick the fluctuations due to the non-linear load behavior
as an event and only flags a segment of data that corresponds to a voltage sag in the
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Figure 3.4.13: Fast Change Tracking of Injected Active Power in the PV Site.
grid as an eventful segment.
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CHAPTER 4
EVENT LOCALIZATION FOR CYBER INTRUSION DETECTION
Even though event detection is an integral part of our cyber-security framework, it
is not sufficient for intrusion detection most of the times. To be able to correlate
the SCADA data with the analytics form µPMUs, one needs to localize the source of
the event to make sure which SCADA packets need to be checked. Inspired by this
requirement, we focus on localizing the source of two important types of events.
The first part of the chapter (sections 4.1-4.2) investigates methodologies to local-
ize a “reconnaissance activity” on the normally-open switch in the substation. In this
section, we propose methods using phasor measurement data to track Thevenin pa-
rameters at substations delivering power to both an unbalanced and balanced feeder.
We then show how tracking Thevenin source impedance can be employed in identi-
fying cyber attackers performing “reconnaissance” in a distribution substation.
With the goal to detect cyber intrusion on the fault detectors that are part of a
Fault Location, Isolation, and Service Restoration (FLISR) system, we develop fault
localization method, where a fault can be localized up to a cluster of neighboring
nodes when there is very few sensors in the grid. We prove that these clusters can be
inferred from the properties of the network and where the sensors are placed. Having
that identified, we propose an optimal PMU placement to achieve fault localization
with highest resolution over the grid. The method is integrated in our cyber-physical
security framework, where the results of PMU-based fault localization is correlated
with the SCADA-reported fault location to check the integrity of the SCADA data.
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4.1 Thevenin Equivalent Estimation
Fig. 4.1.1 shows the Thevenin equivalent circuit as seen from bus 1. This could
be a subtransmission or distribution substation. Due to the integration of PMUs
at the transmission level and µPMUs at the distribution level, measurements of the
three-phase voltage phasor, v[k], and the three-phase current phasor, i[k], are now
available at bus 1 at a very high rate. In steady-state, the following equation holds
thE
thZ
Bus1
Subtransmission/
Distribution Feeder
Transmission Thevenin 
Equivalent
PMU/μPMU
vi
Figure 4.1.1: Transmission Grid Thevenin Equivalent Seen from Substation
for the circuit:
v[k] = Eth[k]− Zth[k]i[k] (4.1.1)
Equivalently, in the sequence domain, we have:
vs[k] = Es[k]− Zs[k]is[k] (4.1.2)
Assuming transposed lines implies that the mutual coupling between the zero, positive
and negative sequence impedance at transmission level is zero. Hence, Zs has the
following form:
Zs =

Z0 0 0
0 Z1 0
0 0 Z2
 (4.1.3)
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In addition, since Eth is representing the generators voltage at the transmission, it can
be considered to be balanced, and therefore can be written in the sequence domain
as:
Es[k] =

0
E1[k]
0
 (4.1.4)
Therefore, we obtain the well-known decoupled set of equations as follows:
v0[k]
v1[k]
v2[k]
=

0
E1[k]
0
−

Z0[k] 0 0
0 Z1[k] 0
0 0 Z2[k]


i0[k]
i1[k]
i2[k]
 . (4.1.5)
4.1.1 Unbalanced Grid
Clearly, from (4.1.5), if the feeder connected to the substation is unbalanced (that
is the case most of the times in the distribution feeders), all the Thevenin parameters
can be estimated at each instant of time using the fact that Z1[k] ≈ Z2[k]:
Z0[k] = −v0[k]
i0[k]
, Z1[k] = −v2[k]
i2[k]
,
E1[k] =
v1[k]i2[k]− v2[k]i1[k]
i2[k]
.
(4.1.6)
In this formulation we are taking full advantage of the inherent unbalanced behav-
ior of the distribution grid that is usually considered a complication for many other
applications. In this context, this feature allows us to update our estimation with the
same frequency as the µPMU output rate. In addition, we are not only estimating
the positive sequence impedance but also the zero sequence impedance. It should be
noted that in some cases such as when the µPMU is placed after a Wye-Delta dis-
tribution transformer, the zero sequence current, i0 is zero at point of measurement,
which means that the zero sequence source impedance is infinite as expected.
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4.1.2 Balanced Grid
When the grid is balanced, which is usually the case at the substations connecting
the transmission grid to a subtransmision circuit, the method discussed above does
not work. In this case, the only non-trivial equation in (4.1.5) is:
v1[k] = E1[k]− Z1[k]i1[k] (4.1.7)
Clearly, what we have in (4.1.7) is a single equation with two unknowns, E1[k] and
Z1[k], which does not have a unique solution. Therefore, we need to make appropriate
approximations. Without loss of generality, we set the voltage phasor angle in (4.1.7)
to zero and accordingly all the angles are reported relative to the voltage phasor
angle. We drop the subscripts in (4.1.7) for simplicity of notation in the rest of this
section. They will be reintroduced in the next sections.
Replacing the load in Fig. 4.1.1 with an equivalent apparent load impedance
ZL = RL + jXL and neglecting the Thevenin resistance of the transmission grid
in comparison with the Thevenin reactance, the corresponding phasor diagram is il-
lustrated in Fig. 4.1.2. It is worth to mention here that the effect of off-nominal


v
jXi
E
Figure 4.1.2: Phasor Diagram of the Equivalent Thevenin Circuit in Fig. 4.1.1 for
Balanced Grid.
frequency is an equal rotation in the vectors of the phasor diagram. Since we re-
port the phasor angles relative to the voltage, this modulation term is accordingly
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removed from the voltage, current and the modeled Thevenin voltage source. We
propose to use the following relationship based on the phasor diagram in Fig. 4.1.2.
Let A[k] = |E[k]| and iim be the imaginary component of the current, then we have:
A2[k]− v2[k]−X2[k]|i[k]|2 + 2iim[k]X[k]v[k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
r(A,X;k)
= 0 (4.1.8)
At each instant of time, there are infinite solutions for A and X as zeros of the
“residual function” r. Assuming that A and X are constant over a window of M
samples, and there is sufficient change in the feeder over this window, we form the
following over-determined homogeneous set of equations:
r(A,X; k −M + 1)
r(A,X; k −M + 2)
...
r(A,X; k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
~r(A,X;k)
=

0
0
...
0

(4.1.9)
Note that we do not assume the angle φ is constant, and the assumptions made per-
tain exclusively to the Thevenin voltage magnitude and source reactance, which are
considered constant over the examined window. Having constant voltage magnitude
is reasonable since the Thevenin voltage source is representing the bulk grid, whose
automatic voltage regulators operate on time-scales longer than those examined here.
Our problem now translates into solving M non-linear quadratic equations. Taking
the squared-norm of the residual vector, ~r(A,X; k), in (4.1.9), we form the following
objective function:
f(A,X; k) =
1
2
||~r(A,X; k)||2 (4.1.10)
which is aimed to be minimized:
min
θ[k]
f(A,X; k) (4.1.11)
67
where θ[k] = [A[k], X[k]]T . The Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm (LMA) is used
to solve the non-linear least square problem. This method replaces the line search
method in Gauss-Newton with a trust region strategy. The LMA overcomes one
of the weaknesses of Gauss-Newton, i.e., the behavior when the Jacobian matrix of
the residual vector is rank-deficient, or is close to be rank-deficient [Nocedal and
Wright(2006)]. This is important in tracking the Thevenin parameter online since
the change in the data during some intervals may return a Jacobian matrix which is
ill-conditioned. The other advantage of the LMA as opposed to the Gauss-Newton
is when the initial guess is far from the minimizer. In this case, Gauss-Newton
converges very slowly or may not converge at all but LMA is proved to perform
better under certain conditions. The implementation of the LMA in our system is
shown in Algorithm. 4.1.
Note that in calculating PLM , we have used an ellipsoidal trust region in place
of a spherical trust region by using the term λdiag(JTJ) instead of λI as suggested
in [Seber and Wild(1989)], where I is the identity matrix. The reason is that our
problem is poorly scaled, or in other words the range of A and X are so different, and
therefore we may face numerical difficulties or produce solutions with poor quality.
The initial guess at time instant k can be provided by the estimated parameters at
time instant k-1, i.e., θ0[k]← θ[k − 1].
Compared to the methods in [Parniani et al.(2006), Arefifar and Xu(2009)], our
formulation leads to a smaller size of the Jacobian matrix, and therefore is compu-
tationally more efficient. Also, the mentioned advantages of LMA over the Gauss-
Newton method used in [Arefifar and Xu(2009)] still remains.
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Algorithm 4.1: Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm (LMA) at time instant k
Input: ~r(A,X; k), and an initial guess θ0[k]
Output: Thevenin parameters at time k
begin
flag=1;
initialize ρ < 1, λ, and  ;
θ[k]← θ0[k];
while flag==1 do
J = ∇~r(θ; k);
PLM = −(JTJ + λdiag(JTJ))−1JT~r(θ; k);
θnew[k]← θ[k] + PLM ;
if f(θnew; k) < f(θ; k) then
λ← ρλ;
θ[k]← θnew[k];
else
λ← λ
ρ
;
if f(θ; k) <  then
flag ← 0;
φ[k] = sin−1(X[k]ir[k]/A[k])
return E[k], X[k];
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4.2 Thevenin Estimation Results
In this section, we present the performance of the proposed Thevenin estimation
through the numerical results for both cases of unbalanced and balanced grid.
4.2.1 Unbalanced Grid Thevenin Parameter Estimation
We modified IEEE-34 test case for our simulation by connecting it to a voltage
source through a lumped transmission line representing the Thevenin impedance as
shown in Fig. 4.2.1. The simulation is done in the DIgSILENT software [Manual and
PowerFactory(2009)] with phasor report rate of 120 Hz. We intentionally imposed
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Figure 4.2.1: Modified IEEE-34 Bus Test Case One-Line Diagram.
the grid to work at off-nominal frequency of 59.9 Hz to simultaneously examine the
effect of the off-nominal frequency on our estimation performance. We expect that
our methodology for unbalanced grid will not be affected by off-nominal frequency
because the estimation at each instant of time only uses the samples at that time.
Table. 4.1 shows the estimated values for positive and zero sequence versus the actual
ones. The estimated values are very close to the actual, which indicates the successful
performance of the estimation. Fig. 4.2.2 shows the magnitude and the angle of the
estimated Thevenin voltage versus the actual values captured from the simulation. As
can be seen, the estimation of the Thevenin voltage is successful, and our algorithm
tracks the parameters even when the off-nominal frequency is non-negligible, which
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Table 4.1: Actual vs Estimated Thevenin Sequence Impedance
Estimated Actual
Z0 2.5533 + j9.4392 2.5716 + j9.4320
Z1 2.9922 + j10.92 2.99 + j10.8901
is clear from the voltage angle.
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Figure 4.2.2: Estimated Thevenin Voltage for Modified IEEE-34 Bus Under Off-
Nominal Frequency.
4.2.2 Balanced Grid Thevenin Parameter Estimation
In balanced case, we first simulated the 39-Bus New-England dynamic model
[Pai(2012)] using DIgSILENT software with a phasor report rate of 120 Hz. A very
slow load ramping event of +2%/sec is defined at load 16, while other loads are
kept constant. The reason of the slow ramping event is to show how our method
is suitable even under slow changes that is necessary for online application since
large changes may not always happen over a short window. Taking a sliding window
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of 30 samples, i.e., M = 30, Fig. 4.2.3 shows the estimated versus actual value of
the Thevenin impedance seen from bus 16. This window corresponds to 0.25 sec,
where the assumption of constant Thevenin voltage magnitude is valid with a very
good approximation. As can be seen, the estimates are very close to the actual values,
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Figure 4.2.3: Estimated Thevenin Reactance Seen from Bus 16 of New England Test
Case Using LMA Method.
which indicate that the LMA method can successfully track the Thevenin parameters.
We attribute the small residual error to the fact that we neglect the resistance.
Using the same sliding window size, the performance of the linear least-square
method under this slow rate of change is illustrated in Fig. 4.2.4. As shown, this
method completely fails to track the actual value of the Thevenin reactance in this
scenario. The reason is most probably due to the fact that the phase angle is assumed
to be constant over the window of samples.
72
54.5 55 55.5 56 56.5 57 57.5 58
Time (Sec)
0.3
0.302
0.304
0.306
0.308
0.31
R
ea
ct
an
ce
(O
hm
)
Estimated Thevenin Reactance with Linear Least-Square
Figure 4.2.4: Estimated Thevenin Reactance Seen from Bus 16 of New England Test
Case Using Linear Least Square Method.
4.2.3 Voltage Stability Index Monitoring
An important application of the online Thevenin estimation algorithm is to mon-
itor the voltage stability index at a load point in the transmission level. We use the
voltage stability index in (4.2.1) that is employed in [Vu et al.(1999)] to test the effec-
tiveness of our Thevenin tracking method for a balanced grid. The index is defined
as follows:
L[k] =
X1[k]
|ZL[k]| =
X1[k]|i1[k]|
v1[k]
(4.2.1)
where ZL[k] is the apparent load impedance at time k. Based on (4.2.1), the stable
and unstable regions are defined as follows:
Stable Region if L[k] ≤ 1
Unstable Region if L[k] > 1
(4.2.2)
For the numerical result, a ramping load event with load steps of +18%/sec is in-
troduced at all the load buses of the New-England 39 Bus test case until the grid
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Figure 4.2.5: Voltage Stability Index Monitoring at Bus 21.
goes unstable. Fig. 4.2.5(a) shows the estimated Thevenin impedance and the mag-
nitude of the apparent impedance. The voltage stability index (L) is also shown
in Fig. 4.2.5(b). From the figure it is evident that the oscillation in the voltage
starts when the magnitude of the apparent impedance meets the estimated Thevenin
impedance or, equivalently, when the voltage stability index (L) crosses 1. This point
corresponds to the maximum loadability of the system and the grid goes unstable be-
yond that. This is another indication that the Thevenin parameter is being tracked
correctly, due to L correctly determining the point of maximum loadability.
4.2.4 Reconnaissance Activity Identification
In this use-case we assume that the substation connected to the distribution feeder
is equipped with a normally-open spare transformer parallel to the main transformer,
to restore the delivery of the power to the feeder when the main transformer fails or
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requires maintenance. Inserting the spare transformer into service, while the main
transformer is also in service, has no adverse effect on the delivery of the power to
the feeder downstream. It is therefore appealing for an attacker to try and test its
ability to control the network through a compromised SCADA network, by changing
the service status of the backup transformer switch when the main transformer is
in service. The attacker may then mask this control action by spoofing the SCADA
packages sent to the control center. The question is “can we detect such an activity
with µPMU data?”
Suppose that we have a µPMU placed at the head of distribution feeder as shown in
Fig. 4.2.6. In this circuit, the dominant term in the Thevenin source impedance would
be due to the transformer impedance. Therefore, when the spare transformer switch
is toggled maliciously, while the main transformer is in service, the source impedance
will roughly reduces to half of its normal value. We propose to track the fast changes
in the estimated positive sequence of the Thevenin source impedance. When a fast
change is found, the magnitude of the change can be extracted to determine whether
it can be attributed to the spare transformer switch or not. From Fig. 4.2.7, when
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Figure 4.2.6: Modified IEEE-34 Test Case for Reconnaissance Attack Identification
the switch gets closed the estimated impedance is almost half of what it was before.
Considering the fact that the dominant term is due to the transformer and such
a change cannot be the consequence of change in the transmission grid topology,
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the most plausible cause is the event that the spare transformer switch was closed.
Once such a change has been detected, the control center is notified to determine if
the change was a scheduled switch or an unexpected switch, potentially indicating
malicious behavior.
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Figure 4.2.7: Online Tracking of the Thevenin Source Impedance using µPMU Mea-
surements
4.3 The Fault Localization Problem
Notation: In this part of the chapter: 1) IN N ×N identity matrix. 2) AT ,AH
transpose and conjugate transpose of A; 3) ||a|| is the 2-norm of vector a; 4) ||A||F
is the Frobenius norm of matrix A; 5) |A|, tr(A) are, respectively, determinant and
trace of A. 6) x ∼ N (µ,Σ) stands for x multivariate normal with expected value µ
and covariance Σ.
Fault localization is a two-step process that first detects a fault and then seek to
determine the location of said fault. This part of the cahpter focuses on the latter,
when a fault has already been detected (for instance using the method we presented
in [Jamei et al.(2017b)], that also provides an estimate of the beginning and end of
the transient event associated with the fault). To keep the formulation general for
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balanced and unbalanced grids with transposed/untransposed lines, we use the three
phase formulation of the Ohm’s law (instead of the sequence domain) so that single
and two phase lines can be considered. For a network of size N , let V and I denote
the nodal voltage and injection current M × 1 vectors:
V = [V T1 , V
T
2 , ..., V
T
N ]
T , I = [IT1 , I
T
2 , ..., I
T
N ]
T
where Vi and Ii are column vectors of size 1, 2 or 3, depending on the number of
phases connected to bus i. From Ohm’s law:
I = YV (4.3.1)
where Y is the admittance matrix. The sources in the grid are modeled with their
Norton equivalent and their internal admittances are included in the Y matrix as well.
We wish to remark that even though the formulation is general, all the numerical
analyses are done using distribution grid test cases, and the algorithm has not been
tested against transmission case in our work.
Let us denote the pre-fault voltage and current as V0 and I0. If we assume that
a fault happens at bus j, we can decompose the nodal injection current post-fault as
IF + IE, where IE is a sparse vector containing the injected fault current at bus j in
its non-zero entries. The localization problem amounts to finding the most likely set
of indexes for these non-zero entries, given the observed measurements.
From (4.3.1), I0 = YV0 and when the measurements have stabilized during fault,
IF + IE = YVF where VF is the post-fault voltage
1. Subtracting the pre-fault from
the post-fault equation:
(IF − I0) + IE = δI + IE = Y(VF −V0) = YδV (4.3.2)
1The assumption is that the post-fault data is recorded before any corrective protection measure
is taken so that the admittance matrix stays the same.
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4.3.1 The Statistical Measurements Model
Let us parse the equations (4.3.2) into those that are associated with available
PMU measurements and those that are not. Let K denote the total number of phases,
for which the nodal voltage and injection current are measured with PMUs. The ma-
trix Πa ∈ {0, 1}K×M is a selection matrix that picks the available measurements in
the voltage/current vector and Πu ∈ {0, 1}(M−K)×M selects the unavailable measure-
ments. Pre-multiplying both sides of (4.3.2) by Π = (ΠTa | ΠTu )T , and replacing Y
with YΠ−1Π (noting that Π−1 = ΠT ) we have:Πa
Πu
 (δI + IE) =
Πa
Πu
Y(ΠTa ΠTu)
Πa
Πu
 δV
δIa
δIu
+
IaE
IuE
 =
Yaa Yau
YTau Yuu

δVa
δVu
 .
(4.3.3)
From (4.3.3), we obtain the two following set of equations:
δIa + I
a
E = YaaδVa + YauδVu (4.3.4)
δIu + I
u
E = Y
T
auδVa + YuuδVu (4.3.5)
Substituting δVu in (4.3.4) using (4.3.5) and reordering some terms:
z =
H︷ ︸︸ ︷(I | − (Yaa −YauY−1uuYTau))
s︷ ︸︸ ︷ δIa
δVa

=
D︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−I | YauY−1uu )
x︷ ︸︸ ︷IaE
IuE
+ C︷ ︸︸ ︷YauY−1uu ︷︸︸︷δIu
(4.3.6)
The term C can be viewed as a noise term, while the term Dx, in which x is a sparse
vector (i.e. the vector IE reordered) whose non-zero entries point to the sites of the
fault.
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Remark. Generally speaking, the noise term C will be relatively small, if the con-
stant impedance loads and capacitors/reactors are also included in the Y matrix,
instead of being modeled in the current injection vector. For constant power loads,
their equivalent admittance at the nominal voltage can be included in the bus admit-
tance matrix, and the deviation of the actual consumed power from the nominal can
be included in the nodal injection vector, so that a similar model can be adopted when
the assumption of constant power loads is more appropriate. This modeling implies
that the vectors IF and I0 are small and, accordingly, their difference δI is small as
well.
Assuming that2  ∼ CN (0, σ2I), whitening the noise term is appropriate. Let the
singular value decomposition of C be:
C = UΣWH (4.3.7)
where U is a (K × K˜), K˜ ≤ K containing the columns spanning the column space of
C, Σ is a diagonal matrix with non-zero singular values of C on its diagonal entries
and W is of size (M −K)× K˜ containing the columns spanning the row space of C.
Pre-multiplying z by Σ−1UH , we have:
y = Σ−1UHz = ε+ Fx (4.3.8)
where F = Σ−1UHD and the noise ε = WH and, since W is semi-unitary, ε ∼
CN (0, σ2I).
We formulate the fault location hypotheses testing problem based on (4.3.8). Let
H` denote the hypothesis that a fault has occurred at location ` ∈ Ft, where Ft is a set
of candidate locations for a detected fault t. To better understand the structure of Ft,
2The pseudo-covariance matrix is assumed to be zero for all complex normally distributed vectors
so it is omitted from the definition for simplicity.
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consider the three-phase diagram in Fig. 4.3.1 of a sample 5-bus system including 3
three-phase nodes and two single phase nodes: suppose that detected fault t indicates
1a
1b
1c
4b
2a
2b
2c
3a
3b
3c
5a
Figure 4.3.1: Sample Three-Phase Line Diagram.
a three phase fault. The candidate fault locations are:
Ft =
{{1a, 1b, 1c}, {2a, 2b, 2c}, {3a, 3b, 3c}}
and buses 4 and 5 are excluded since they are single phase.
Let us assume that the noise variance σ2 is known. We also assume that: 1)
conditioned on the hypothesisH`, the sparse vector x has its non-zero entries normally
distributed. This can be captured by x|H` ∼ CN (µ`,Φ`), where µ` is a sparse vector
containing the expected value for the fault current under hypothesisH` at its non-zero
entries and Φl = E[xxH |H`] is a diagonal covariance matrix, which is only non-zero
at entries corresponding to the candidate location `. Thus:
Fx|H` ∼ CN (Fµ`,FΦ`FH)
Assuming that Fx|H` and ε|H` are independent, we have:
y|H` ∼ CN (
m`︷︸︸︷
Fµ`,
Ψ`︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ2I + FΦ`FH) (4.3.9)
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Denoting by f(y|H`) the probability density function of y|H` and by λ`(y) = ln f(y|H`)
the log-likelihood function, the maximum likelihood (ML) detector of the fault loca-
tion is:
`∗ = argmax
`∈Ft
λ`(y)
= argmin
`∈Ft
(y −m`)HΨ−1` (y −m`) + ln(piK |Ψ`|). (4.3.10)
In this case, the values of these non-zero entries in the mean and covariance are not
known but can be approximated. Suppose that there is a PMU installed at each
source node in the grid (e.g., substation, generators,...). Let the vectors Is,0 and
Is,F denote the sum of the current injected by each source for each faulty phase into
the grid during pre and post-fault condition, respectively. Fig. 4.3.2 shows one-line
diagram of a sample test case after a fault, which is supplied through sources 1 and 2.
There is a PMU installed next to each one measuring the three-phase line pre-fault
Source 1 Source 2
65I12I
1 2 3 4 5 6
PMU 1 PMU 2
Figure 4.3.2: Composition of Vectors Is,0 and Is,F .
currents I12,0 = (i
a
12,0, i
b
12,0, i
c
12,0)
T and I65,0 = (i
a
65,0, i
b
65,0, i
c
65,0)
T and post-fault currents
I12,F and I65,F . Assume that the fault detectors indicate that a fault is on phase b
and c. The vectors, Is,0 and Is,F are formed as follows for this fault:
Is,0 = [i
b
12,0, i
c
12,0]
T + [ib65,0, i
c
65,0]
T
Is,F = [i
b
12,F , i
c
12,F ]
T + [ib65,F , i
c
65,F ]
T
Forming the vectors Is,0 and Is,F for other types of fault follows a similar approach.
Note that if P denotes the number of faulty phases, the vectors Is,0 and Is,F are of
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size P × 1. We can use these vectors to estimate the values of the mean and the
covariance of the non-zero entries of IE. We first define matrix Al ∈ {0, 1}M×P that
is zero everywhere except for a block equal to the identity matrix IP corresponding to
the fault location indexed by l. For a given fault at node `∗, the value of the non-zero
entries in µ` equal approximately to the sum of the currents flowing from the sources
into the grid minus the current flowing into the grid before the fault occurred on the
corresponding faulty phases. Denoting by δIs = (Is,F − Is,0), no matter where the
fault is, we can use the following approximation:
µ` = E[x|Hl] = AlδIs (4.3.11)
Also, the variance can be set to be a certain percentage of the value |[δIs]j|2, i.e.
[Γs]jj = ρ|[δIs]j|2, where ρ accounts for the percentage approximation error made in
assuming that the fault current is completely accounted for by the source currents
change. Hence:
Φ` = AlΓsA
T
l → Ψ` = σ2I + FAlΓsATl FH (4.3.12)
Before going through the discussion of the fault identifiability, it should be noted
that we have introduced faults at nodes, to have finite and countable number of
hypotheses. In reality, a fault occurs on a line. If the method was able to locate the
fault at full resolution, then the two nodes with the highest λl(y) would determine
the faulty line. However, as we discuss in the next section, the fault localization
method here can locate a fault with low-resolution up to a certain neighborhood of
the actual location, and therefore putting a fault on a line or on its closest node would
not change the end result.
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4.4 Fault Location Identifiability
If for a given fault at location `∗, the value of the metric λ`(y) in (4.3.10) is close to
λk(y) (k 6= `∗, ` = `∗), the location of the fault can be mis-identified due to different
sources of error such as approximation errors, noisy measurements, etc.
Definition. For each possible `∗ a cluster is a set of nodes for which λ`(y) ≈ λ`∗(y)
under y|H`∗.
We wish to investigate if the properties of the grid and the connection of the nodes
affect the closeness of the log-likelihood value in (4.3.10), using the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence [Kullback and Leibler(1951)] of the two probability density functions
f(y|H`) and f(y|Hk). The KL divergence is:
DKL(f(y|H`)‖f(y|Hk)) = ln |Ψk||Ψ`| + tr
(
Ψ−1k Ψ`
)−K
+
(
F(Ak −A`)δIs
)H
Ψ−1k
(
F(Ak −A`)δIs
)
(4.4.1)
In this application the weighted mean of the observations is very large compared to
the noise σ2 . This leads to the following proposition, which is valid in our application:
Proposition 2. Let F˜k = FAkΓ
1/2
s , ξ = Γ
−1/2
s δIs and assume: ∀k ‖F˜k‖
2
F
σ2
 1. Then,
the following holds:
DKL(f(y|H`)‖f(y|Hk)) ≈ ξ
HF˜H` Π˜
⊥
k F˜`ξ
σ2
(4.4.2)
where Π˜
⊥
k = (I−F˜k(F˜Hk F˜k)−1F˜Hk ) is the projector onto the subspace orthogonal to the
columns of F˜k.
Proof. First, the first and the second terms in the KL divergence expression are just
a function of the covariance matrices. Therefore, the following approximation holds:
DKL(f(y|H`)‖f(y|Hk)) ≈ ‖F(Ak −A`)δIs‖2Ψ−1k (4.4.3)
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Second, we note that F(Ak−A`)δIs = (F˜k− F˜`)ξ and applying the matrix inversion
lemma and using the assumption
‖F˜k‖2F
σ2
 1:
Ψ−1k =
1
σ2
(I − F˜k(σ2I + F˜Hk F˜k)−1F˜Hk ) ≈
1
σ2
Π˜
⊥
k (4.4.4)
Noting that by definition Π˜
⊥
k F˜k = 0, the statement follows.
Note that F˜k include a weighted subset of columns of the matrix F = Σ
−1UHD
defined after (4.3.8). Let fk denote a column of the matrix F. Their correlation is
the absolute value of the cosine of the angle between them:
r`k =
|fH` fk|
||f`|| ||fk|| (4.4.5)
From what has been shown, as r`k increases for two locations ` and k, the divergence
of their corresponding hypotheses reduces and therefore it is more likely that they
are mistaken with each other. Locations with high correlation coefficient belong to
the same cluster.
What we wish for the design is to have the sizes of the classes of vectors with
high mutual correlation to be as even as possible, so that we can have the finest
localization resolution. The consequence that we draw from this observation is that,
it is desirable to have the matrix F with the flattest possible spectrum. It is worth
noting that the rows of F are orthogonal and its spectrum is easily relatable to the
placement. In fact, DDH = (I + CCH) since D = (−I | YauY−1uu ) = (−I | C) and,
because of (4.3.7):
FFH = Σ−1UH(I + CCH)UΣ−1 = (Σ−2 + I) (4.4.6)
which clearly indicates that in designing the placement we want as flat a spectrum
as possible for CCH = YauY
−1
uuY
−H
uu Y
H
au, since Σ
−2 are the eigenvalues of its inverse.
This suggests to minimize the so called Shatten infinity norm of the matrix YauY
−1
uu ,
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which is the infinity norm ‖σ‖∞ of the vector σ containing the non-zero singular
values of YauY
−1
uu .
4.4.1 Optimal Phasor Measurement Unit Placement
Let P denote the set of all permutation matrices. We present the following place-
ment strategy:
Πopt = argmin
Π∈P
‖σ(YauY−1uu )‖∞
s.t. ΠYΠT =
Yaa Yau
YTau Yuu
 (4.4.7)
From (4.4.7), the placement problem is combinatorial and exponentially complex
so it does not scale well. We use a greedy search as an alternative to reduce the
time complexity to polylog. The pseudo-code of the used greedy search is shown in
Algorithm. 4.2. In spite of the complexity of (4.4.7) it is possible to predict how
to obtain good placements looking at the structure of the graph, and particularly
of its natural clustering in sub-graphs with higher connectivity within themselves
(in network science, these sub-graphs are often referred to as communities). This
is because the spectral properties we are seeking can be tied to selecting nodes in
such a way that the sparsity patterns of the rows of Yau and of Yuu separate in
clusters. Since there are few observable nodes, the rank of the matrix Yau is limited
by its number of rows. The algorithm performs best if the rows of YauY
−1
uu are
as uncorrelated from each other as possible. Given the similarity of line parameter
values, low correlation is mostly attained by having non overlapping support among of
the rows in YauY
−1
uu . As the next example illustrates, this can be attained by having
Yuu as close as possible to a block diagonal matrix, where the diagonal blocks as
matched to the non zero portions of rows Yau. This is possible if the neighborhoods
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Algorithm 4.2: Greedy Search Pseudo-Code for PMU Placement.
Initialization
P := Number of available PMUs;
S := Number of source nodes;
P := {Source Nodes} //Nodes with PMU;
M := Set of candidate placement buses;
begin
for p=1..P-S do
Cost←∞;
for each m ∈M do
P := P ∪ {m};
given P , calculate ‖σ(YauY−1uu )‖∞;
if ‖σ(YauY−1uu )‖∞ < Cost then
mopt ← m;
Cost← ‖σ(YauY−1uu )‖∞;
P := P \ {m};
P := P ∪ {mopt};
M :=M\ {mopt};
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of the buses where the sensors are located, have the smallest intersection possible.
For example, for the system in Fig. 4.4.1, if the PMUs are placed at bus 2 and 5, the
1 2 3 4 5 6
34y 45y 56y12y 23y
Figure 4.4.1: One-Line Diagram of a Sample Radial Network
admittance matrix is partitioned in the following desirable way:
Y =

y2 0 −y12 −y23 0 0
0 y5 0 0 −y45 −y56
−y12 0 y1 0 0 0
−y23 0 0 y3 −y34 0
0 −y45 0 −y34 y4 0
0 −y56 0 0 0 y6

This design is clearly distancing the PMUs in the graph and dividing the network in
neighborhoods, each associated with one of the sensors immediate and two hop neigh-
bors where measurements are unavailable. The ambiguity that remains is confined
to a connected set of buses that are topologically close to the PMU sensors. Hence,
the optimum resolution for a certain grid is tied to the same intrinsic topological
properties that are studied in graph clustering.
4.5 Numerical results and applications
In this section, we first corroborate our technical discussion and then showcase its
application in the forensic analysis of cyber attacks to FLISR systems. In the numer-
ical simulations we use the IEEE-34 bus and 123 test feeders (c.f. [Kersting(2001)]).
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4.5.1 Sensor Placement and Identified Clusters
Before analyzing the results of the fault identification algorithm based on (4.3.10),
we identify the greedy-based placement for the PMUs based on (4.4.7). We highlight
the clustering by showing the values of r`k in (4.4.5) that exceed a certain threshold
τ through images (all r`k < τ are set to zero).
4.5.1.1 IEEE-34 Bus Test Feeder
The one-line diagram of the test-case is shown in Fig. 4.5.1, where a 100 kW generator
is added at bus 848. This grid is unbalanced and radial and has untransposed lines
and one phase laterals. Also, without loss of generality, only the nodes at the same
voltage level have been studied. As did the placement on the reduced network, where
800
802 806 808
810
812 814
R1
850
816
818
820
822
824 826
828 830 854 856
852
R2
832
838
862
840836860834858
864
842
844
846
848
Substation
DG1
Figure 4.5.1: Reduced IEEE-34 Test Case with Added Generator.
the laterals are rolled up to avoid putting a PMU on a single phase node. Assuming
that there are 4 PMUs available i.e., P = 4, Table. 4.2 shows the greedy-based
location of the sensors and the random placement used as a comparison. Since this
is a small case, we are able to do the exhaustive search to understand how well the
greedy search has performed. For this purpose, we calculated the relative optimality
gap that shows a value of 0.75% for the greedy-based search versus 7.61% for the
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Table 4.2: PMU Locations for IEEE-34 Bus
Test Case #PMUs Greedy-based sites Random sites
IEEE-34 4 800-830-848-840 800-814-816-848
random case that puts the greedy-based to fall below 1% optimality gap.
It is clear from the locations in Fig. 4.5.1 according to Table. 4.2 that the sensors
are placed to cover the grid. Fig. 4.5.2(a) shows the thresholded correlation (4.4.5)
of the columns of F corresponding to phase-A for the greedy-based placement in
Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.5.2(b) is the same quantity for the F that corresponds to the
random choice. Since high correlation leads to low KL divergence, the clusters of light
gray values effectively represent fault locations that are hard to discriminate. The
larger the cluster, the lower the resolution. Hence, Fig. 4.5.2(b) clearly illustrates
the impact on the resolution of a bad sensor siting, when compared to the clustering
that emerges in Fig. 4.5.2(a). The correlation coefficients heat-map for the columns
Random Placement
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Greedy Search Placement
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5.2: Correlation of Columns of F for IEEE-34 Bus Case Related to Phase-A
for a) Greedy-based Location b) Random Location with τ = 0.814
corresponding to phase-B and phase-C in the matrix F have a similar pattern as
in Fig. 4.5.2. To corroborate our conjecture that the placement is affected by the
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intrinsic topology of the graph and its clusters, in Fig. 4.5.3 we highlight the set of
buses that exhibit high correlation based on the greedy-based placement, by building a
graph adjacency matrix such that its `k entry [A]`k = u(r`k−τ)3 using the correlation
coefficients of columns of F corresponding to phase-A and overlaying it on the IEEE-
34 test case topology. As we predicted, the highly correlated nodes are those that are
800 802 806 808 812 814
828 830 854
832
858 834 860 836 840
862
850 816 824
852
848
822
846
820
844
818
864 842
Figure 4.5.3: Adjacency Matrix Graph for Correlation Coefficients of Columns of F
with τ = 0.814 Corresponding to Phase-A.
located in a neighborhood of each other.
4.5.1.2 IEEE-123 Bus Test Feeder
The analysis of the larger IEEE-123 test case, with a greedy-based assignment of
10 PMUs, returns the results in Table 4.3. Once again, we did the placement after
rolling up the single and two-phase laterals and only nodes at the same voltage level
are analyzed. The one-line diagram and node numbering of this case can be found
in [Kersting(2001)]. The PMUs in this case also are spread over different areas of
the grid topology to form communities of neighboring nodes of comparable sizes.
3u(x) is the step function u(x) = 1 if x > 0 and u(x) = 0 else.
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Table 4.3: Greedy-based Sensor Locations for IEEE-123 Bus
Test Case #PMUs Greedy-based Location
IEEE-123 10 149-81-61-56-105-250-86-151-72-57
The thresholded heat-map given in Fig. 4.5.4 based on the placement of Table 4.3,
highlights the balance across clusters.
Optimal Placement
0
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0.3
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0.5
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0.9
1
Figure 4.5.4: Correlation of Columns of F for IEEE-123 Bus Case Related to Phase-A
for Greedy-based Location with τ = 0.814
4.5.2 Fault Localization Algorithm
The synthetic PMU data for this experiment were generated using the OpenDSS
software [Dugan(2012)]. We first record the pre-fault data were using a power-flow
snapshot and then we introduce a fault in the dynamic mode to represent the behavior
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of the grid after a fault occurs. Note that the tap changers usually have a delay for
15-30 seconds in order to respond to a change so the voltage and current data should
be recorded before the tap value changes, so that the admittance matrix stays the
same before and after the fault.
4.5.2.1 IEEE-34 Bus Test Feeder
Fig. 4.5.5 shows the value of the log-likelihood function λ`(y) for different hypotheses
when a single-phase to ground fault occurs at phase-A of bus 820. As our analysis
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Fault Location Candidate Bus
Figure 4.5.5: Log-Likelihood Value for Fault at Bus 820-Phase-A
indicated, using the metric in (4.3.10) shown in Fig. 4.5.3 it becomes readily apparent
that one can narrow down the location of the fault up to a certain resolution, since a
cluster of nodes return very close log-likelihood value. These are also the nodes that
correspond to high values of r`k with respect to the actual location of the fault. To
further test and verify the fault localization method, we introduce different types of
fault and show the results of the fault localization in Table 4.4 under the greedy-based
placement.
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Table 4.4: Identified Fault Locations for IEEE-34 Bus Case
Fault Type Exact Fault Location Locations with High-
est λ`(y)
LLL 816 814,816,850
A-G 822 814,816,818,820,822,850
BC-G 852 832,852,858
AC-G 836 836,840,862
AB-G 808 800,802,806,808
4.5.2.2 IEEE-123 Bus Test Feeder
We extend the analysis of the fault localization algorithm to IEEE-123 test case for
different types of fault after the placement of the sensors on the locations in Table 4.3.
Fig. 4.5.6(a) shows the log-likelihood value of different hypotheses for a three-phase
fault at bus 160. Part of the correlation coefficients heat-map that illustrates the
correlation of the columns that have high correlation with bus 160 is snipped out of
Fig. 4.5.4 and is illustrated in Fig. 4.5.6(b). As expected, the neighboring nodes that
also have high correlation with bus 160 are those which have the closest log-likelihood
value in our metric and can be mis-identified as the fault location.
Other types of faults and the potential locations with highest λ`(y) are summa-
rized in Table 4.5.
We introduce faults at different locations of the grid and the results show that the
fault is identifiable up to the resolution of the clusters of neighboring nodes identified
with the correlation coefficients. An interesting case is the two-phase fault at node
57 (last row in Table 4.5), where the fault is identifiable with a high resolution. This
is consistent with our claims, since the coefficients r`k reveal that there is no other
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Figure 4.5.6: a) Log-Likelihood Value for Three-Phase Fault at Bus 160 and b) Cor-
relation of Corresponding Columns of F-phase A.
node with very high correlation with this specific node.
4.5.2.3 Comparison with the State of the Art
Our approach in using the pre and post-fault samples and treating the fault as a
current injection improves upon the work in [Brahma(2011)] through its statistical
underpinning. To show this, we introduce a two-phase fault at bus 836-A-C and the
results are shown in Fig. 4.5.7. The original method in [Brahma(2011)] is designed as
a minimization problem to find the fault location so we changed it to a maximization
by adding a negative sign to make a better visual comparison with our method. The
results clearly show that our described method can locate the fault more accurately
than the algorithm in [Brahma(2011)].
Besides this improvement, investigating the reason behind this ambiguity is miss-
ing in [Brahma(2011)], whereas we have investigates this matter theoretically and
analytically in our work. In addition, we have presented a sensor placement strategy
here to place the sensors at nodes that would return the highest fault localization
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Table 4.5: Identified Fault Locations for IEEE-123 Bus Case
Fault Type Exact Fault Location Locations with High-
est λ`(y)
LLL 42 40,42,44,47,48
A-G 108 105,108,109,300,110,
111,112,113,114
BC-G 89 86,87,89,91,93,95
AC-G 50 47,48,49,50,51,151
AB-G 57 57
resolution.
4.5.3 Application to Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection
We leveraged the insights from this work to enhance our network intrusion detec-
tion system testbed hosted at Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) [Gentz(2017)]
and incorporate additional rules to monitor for cyber attacks that interfere with the
normal operations of FLISR systems [Uluski(2012)]. Our testbed (see Fig. 4.5.8) is
defined as a hierarchical architecture to fast-detect the presence of attacks against
networked devices controlling physical systems by correlating analytic results from
SCADA traffic (which includes traces from fault detector communications) with
PMUs deployed sparsely over a distribution system [Gentz(2017)].
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Figure 4.5.7: Fault Localization for Fault at Bus 836-A-C Using a) Method in
[Brahma(2011)] b) Described Method.
4.5.3.1 The FLISR System Operations and Vulnerabilities
FLISR systems detect the location of a permanent fault 4 in a feeder and automati-
cally restore service to customers in the healthy section of the feeder. To do so they
employ directional fault detectors, installed at every line in a distribution feeder, that
communicate the occurrence of a fault and its direction to a distribution manage-
ment system (DMS). The DMS analyzes these data and, once the faulted section
is identified, issues commands to a predetermined set of switches to first isolate the
faulted section and then restore service to the non-faulted areas [Uluski(2012)], so as
to minimize the service disruption. Consider the one-line diagram of a sample radial
network shown in Fig. 4.5.9 to describe how FLISR works. The network is connected
to a substation at bus 1 and a distributed generation is connected to bus 6. Fault
detectors and normally-closed switches are connected at the end of every line. When
a fault happens at line 3− 4, all the fault detectors detect the presence of this fault
4Temporary faults that clear themselves below a certain time threshold do not trigger the FLISR
operation.
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such that fault detectors at buses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the fault is in their right
side, whereas fault detectors at buses 4, 5 and 6 indicate the fault is to their left.
Fault localization analysis at the DMS using this information identifies the faulted
section to be line 3 − 4. The DMS, therefore, sends control signals to automatically
open switches to the right of bus 3 and to the left of bus 4 splitting the network into
two parts and restoring service to customers on both sections.
Fault detector data is transmitted to the DMS through a wide area network using
industrial protocols such as DNP3 [IEEE(2012)] or Modbus [Modbus(2004)] which
are not designed with security concerns in mind. Therefore, a dedicated attacker
can tamper with fault detector data either remotely, through a compromised network
device (e.g., a router), or by physically connecting herself to an exposed section of
the communication network. For instance, the tampering can lead the DMS analysis
to pick the wrong location for an actual fault or hide the presence of a fault.
Although such attacks can be partially prevented by enabling photographically
authenticated communication on top of the stated communication protocols, such a
measure does not prevent the whole spectrum of possible cyber attacks. Therefore, a
more robust approach, that does not merely rely on cryptographic solutions, is desired
that is capable of detecting the presence of an attacker. The analysis we carried out
in this part of the chapter shows that, even with a very limited number of sensors
scattered in the systems, the PMU localization performed using (4.3.10) enhances an
operator’s confidence about the fault localization information (or the lack of thereof)
extracted from fault detectors data, by giving an additional means to verify the
trustworthiness of the SCADA messaging, albeit at a lower spatial resolution. In the
next section we illustrate the effectiveness of the forensic analysis on FLISR attacks
carried out using a experiment, with simulated streaming SCADA and PMU data, to
our LBNL testbed in Fig. 4.5.8.
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4.5.3.2 Intrusion Detection on Fault Detectors
In our simulation to demonstrate intrusion detection on fault detectors, we use the
modified IEEE 34-bus system shown in Fig. 4.5.10. We introduce a two-phase AC-
G fault at line 860 − 836. Our PMU data analytic results correctly indicate the
fault to be in Zone D. We generate simulated SCADA data for each fault detector
in the network using the openDNP3 library [Open DNP3 Group and others(2012)]
that implements the DNP3 communication protocol. In our simulation, we modify
the packets from some of the fault detectors (those at buses 834 and 860) so that
the SCADA data analytics indicate the fault is at line 834− 842, which is in zone C.
The inconsistent results from the PMU data analytics and the SCADA data analytics
raise an alarm about a possible cyber-attack on the fault detectors.
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Figure 4.5.8: LBNL Stream-Processing Architecture for Real-time Cyber-physical Se-
curity (SPARCS) used in our experiments [Gentz(2017)], [Peisert et al.(2017)], [Peisert
et al.(2018)]. Its components are: 1) The Bro IDS, the industry-standard, network
monitoring framework; 2) a publish-subscribe messaging system called RabbitMQ
used to transfer PMU and SCADA data and analysis results; 3) the Cassandra
database, used for permanent archiving of all data; 4) The Elasticsearch database,
which collects analysis results and receives events notifications in real time; 5) Bea-
gleBone Black (BBB) devices that receive synchrophasor data at a rate of 120 sam-
ples/sec, and analyze 1 sec. worth of data at a time to rapidly detect a cyber-physical
event [Jamei et al.(2016)].
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CHAPTER 5
GAS AND ELECTRIC GRID UNIT COMMITMENT WITH COORDINATED
N-1 GENERATOR CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS
The inter-dependency between the gas and electric grid is growing as the re-
liance on the gas-fired generators increases. Strong coupling between two large in-
frastructures requires a coordinated planning and operational framework. In fact,
the constraints of both grids must be respected, while their objective functions are
co-optimized. In this chapter, we present a new formulation for Gas and Electric
Grid Coordinated Unit Commitment (GECUC). We apply the standard DC power
flow approximation and propose a new formulation to relax the non-linear gas grid
constraints so that the GECUC can be mapped into a Mixed-Integer Linear Program
(MILP). In addition, the N-1 generator contingency security constraints are extended
to include the gas grid constraints and find the required reserve from gas wells and
generators after the loss of a generating unit.
Throughout the chapter, for simplicity of notation, the following convention is
made unless explicitly otherwise mentioned: ∀t ≡ ∀t ∈ T ,∀w ≡ ∀w ∈ W ,∀g ≡ ∀g ∈
G,∀i ≡ ∀i ∈ Vg,∀k ≡ ∀k ∈ Eg, ∀b ≡ ∀b ∈ Ee, ∀q ≡ ∀q ∈ Q.
AT and [A]m denotes the transpose and m-th element of A, respectively, and finally
T = |T |.
5.1 Gas Network
The following components comprise the natural gas grid.
Suppliers and Loads: Gas is injected or withdrawn at different points in the
gas grid. Most of the gas is supplied by the wells. The gas loads could be residential,
commercial, or industrial (gas-fired generators are in the third category). Unlike for
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electric power systems, gas can be stored in some locations during the off-peak hours
and withdrawn during the peak hours. These locations therefore play the role of
supplier during some hours and of load during the other hours.
Pipelines: Similar to power grid lines, the pipelines in a natural gas grid are
designed to deliver gas from suppliers to loads. Generally speaking, gas grids are
radial or very weakly-meshed.
Compressors: Since the gas pressure drops over the gas pipeline, compres-
sors are placed at different points of the grid (usually every 50-100 miles) [Misra
et al.(2015)] to increase the gas pressure. Some compressors use part of the natural
gas to run their engines, and others use electricity. Gas pipelines with compressor are
referred to as active pipelines, which also form the set Eag ⊆ Eg, while the pipelines
without a compressor are referred to as passive pipelines.
5.1.1 Steady-State Gas Flow Equations
For a passive pipeline k that is defined “from” bus i “to” bus j, the relationship
between the gas flow over the line and the nodal pressure at two ends is as follows
[Misra et al.(2015)]:
pi2i − pi2j = hkfk|fk|, ∀k ∈ Eg\Eag . (5.1.1)
where the constant hk depends on the pipeline friction factor, diameter, length, gas
compressibility factor, gas constant, and gas temperature. The relationship in (5.1.1)
can be extended to include active pipelines, i.e.,
ρ2kpi
2
i − pi2j = hkfk|fk|, ∀k ∈ Eg. (5.1.2)
where ρk is the compression ratio of line k, that is the ratio of the compressor outlet
and inlet square pressure. Clearly, for passive pipelines, ρk = 1, and therefore (5.1.2)
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reduces to (5.1.1). In eq. (5.1.2), it is assumed that the compressors are placed at the
“from” node of the pipelines for simplicity of notation. However, the model is simply
extendable to more general cases.
5.1.2 Optimal Gas Flow (OGF) Problem
Similar to the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) in the electric grid, the objective of the
OGF is to find the economic hourly schedule of the gas wells/storage, while respecting
the constraints of the gas grid. Throughout the chapter, it is assumed that the gas
wells are always committed. For simplicity, the gas storage is modeled similar to a
gas well, which allows for zero production unlike the gas well , which the minimum
production is constrained based on a contract, but the inter-temporal constraints of
the storage have not been considered. The problem is then formulated as:
Minimize:
∑
t∈T
∑
w∈W
dwGw(t) + d
res
w rgw(t) (5.1.3)
Subject to:
Gw(t) ≥ Gminw , ∀t, w (5.1.4a)
Gw(t) + rgw(t) ≤ Gmaxw , ∀t, w (5.1.4b)
rgw(t) ≥ 0, ∀t, w (5.1.4c)∑
w∈W
rgw(t) ≥ βgas
∑
i∈Vg
Li(t), ∀t (5.1.4d)
∑
w∈W(i)
Gw(t) +
∑
k∈µ+i
fk(t)−
∑
k∈µ−i
fk(t) = Li(t)
∀t, i (5.1.4e)
pimini ≤ pii(t) ≤ pimaxi , ∀t, i (5.1.4f)
ρk(t)pii(t) ≤ pimaxpipe ∀t, k ∈ Eag (5.1.4g)
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pi2i (t) = pi
2
s , ∀t, i ∈ Ws (5.1.4h)
ρ2k(t)pi
2
i (t)− pi2j (t) = hkfk(t)|fk(t)|, ∀t, k (5.1.4i)
The gas production at each well/storage is limited by the contracts and the capacity of
the production, which is imposed by (5.1.4a) and (5.1.4b). For a storage, the minimum
limit would be zero. The gas nodal balance constraint is imposed by (5.1.4e). Similar
to the electric grid, we define a variable rgw(t) to account for an increase in the gas
demand, when a contingency of a base-load generator in the electric grid happens,
and as a result some of the gas generators are re-dispatched/committed to make up
for the lost generator, especially in the form of non-spinning reserve. It is assumed
that the summation of the potential reserve over all the wells/storage at each hour
should be greater than βgas ∈ (0, 1) times of the net gas base-case load at that hour.
The pressure limit at each node and pressure limit of the pipelines are imposed by
Eq. (5.1.4f),(5.1.4g). Finally, the pressure at the slack node is fixed.
The only non-linearity in the OGF appears in Eq. (5.1.4i) due to the quadratic
terms and the absolute value. In order to deal with the absolute value term, we first
define the following auxiliary variables:
fk(t) = f
+
k (t)− f−k (t), f+k (t) ≥ 0, f−k (t) ≥ 0 ∀t, k (5.1.5)
where f+k (t) should be non-zero only when the flow is in the positive direction, oth-
erwise f−k (t) should be non-zero. To enforce this, we define:
zk(t) =

1 if fk(t) > 0
0 else
(5.1.6)
Therefore, after adding the following set of constraints to the problem:
0 ≤ f+k (t) ≤M1Zk(t), ∀t, k (5.1.7a)
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0 ≤ f−k (t) ≤M1(1− Zk(t)), ∀t, k /∈ Eag (5.1.7b)
f−k (t) = 0, ∀t, k ∈ Eag (5.1.7c)
we can rewrite Eq. (5.1.4i), (5.1.4e) as:∑
w∈W(i)
Gw(t) +
∑
k∈µ+i
(
f+k (t)− f−k (t)
)−
∑
k∈µ−i
(
f+k (t)− f−k (t)
)
= Li(t)
∀t, i (5.1.8a)
ρ2k(t)pi
2
i (t)− pi2j (t) = hk
(
f+
2
k (t)− f−
2
k (t)
)
, ∀t, k (5.1.8b)
In the added constraints above, M1 is a parameter and is chosen to be a big enough
value for the flow. Also, constraint Eq. (5.1.7c) is added to account for the fact
that the active pipelines only pass the flow in one direction. The advantage of this
reformulation is that the flow direction has been implicitly considered using linear
constraints. However, new variables including new binary variables have been intro-
duced that can add to the complexity of the problem. Also, the number of constraints
of the problem has increased compared to the non-linear formulation.
The only remaining non-linearity is due to the quadratic terms. For the pressure,
it is easy to define the auxiliary variables as follows:
pi2i (t) = p˜ii(t)⇒ p˜imini ≤ p˜ii(t) ≤ p˜imaxi , ∀t, i (5.1.9)
ρ2k(t)p˜ii(t) ≤ p˜imaxpipe ∀t, k ∈ Eag (5.1.10)
p˜ii(t) = pi
2
s , ∀t, i ∈ Ws (5.1.11)
However, the same approach cannot be used for the flow terms as the flow itself (and
not the squared flow) appears in the gas nodal balance constraint. We use a piece-
wise linearization formulation of the flows f+
2
k and f
−2
k over a range [0,M2] in this
case. The following constraints are therefore added to the problem:
γ+k (t) ≥ α[n]f+k (t) + β[n], ∀t, k, n (5.1.12)
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γ−k (t) ≥ α[n]f−k (t) + β[n], ∀t, k, n (5.1.13)
where γ+k (t) and γ
−
k (t) are approximations of f
+2
k (t) and f
−2
k (t) over a range M2,
respectively. α[n] and β[n] are the coefficients of the piece-wise linearized quadratic
curve. The constraint Eq. (5.1.8b) is then rewritten as:
ρ2k(t)pi
2
i (t)− pi2j (t) = hk
(
γ+k (t)− γ−k (t)
)
, ∀t, k (5.1.14)
The objective function in Eq. (5.1.3) should also change accordingly in order to make
sure γ+k (t) and γ
−
k (t) does not sit above the second order curve as follows:
Min
∑
t∈T
( ∑
w∈W
dwGw(t) + d
res
w rgw(t)
+
∑
k∈Eg
a1γ
+
k (t) + a2γ
−
k (t)
) (5.1.15)
where a1 and a2 are the weights of the added terms in the objective function.
5.2 GECUC Formulation
The GECUC problem formulation brings the OGF and UC problem under a
unified framework. In the numerical results, we show how solving a UC irrespective
to the gas grid constraints can result in infeasible scheduled grid operation. The
optimization problem can then be formulated as follows1:
Min
∑
t∈T
(∑
g∈G
(
Cx
T
g Xg(t) + C
rT
g Rg(t) + c
nl
g ug(t)
+ cstg vg(t)
)
+
∑
w∈W
(
dwGw(t) + d
res
w rgw(t)
)
+
(∑
k∈Eg
a1γ
+
k (t) + a2γ
−
k (t)
))
(5.2.1)
where the q-th element of vector Xg(t) with size |Q|, corresponds to the power pro-
duction at time t of generator g for segment q, Pg,q(t) and the corresponding element
1AT is the transpose of vector A.
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in vector Cxg is the cost related to it. For generator g at time t, the generation reserve
vector is defined as:
Rg(t) = [r
ru
g (t), r
rd
g (t), r
s
g(t), r
ns
g (t)]
T
where the elements correspond to the regulation-up, regulation-down, spinning, and
non-spinning reserve, respectively. Accordingly, the cost related to each reserve is
defined in the vector Crg.
The minimization is subject to the power grid and gas grid constraints that are
presented in the following sections.
5.2.1 Power Grid Constraints
The power grid constraints are split into three parts. The first part goes over the
production and reserve level requirements. The second part describes the ramp-rate
limits, and finally the third part explains the constraints on commitment variables.
1) Production and Reserve Limits
Pg(t) = 1
T .Xg(t), ∀t, g (5.2.2a)
[Xg]q.ug(t) ≤ [Xg(t)]q ≤ [Xg]q.ug(t), ∀t, g, q (5.2.2b)
Pg(t) + [1, 0, 1, 0].Rg(t) ≤ Pmaxg .ug(t), ∀t, g (5.2.2c)
Pming .ug(t) ≤ Pg(t)− [Rg(t)]2, ∀t, g (5.2.2d)∑
g∈G
[Rg(t)]m ≥ βel
∑
n∈Ve
dn(t), ∀t,m = 1, 2 (5.2.2e)
∑
g∈G
[Rg(t)]3 ≥ 1
2
max
g
(Pmaxg ), ∀t (5.2.2f)
[0, 0, 1, 1].
∑
g∈G
Rg(t) ≥ max
g
(Pmaxg ), ∀t (5.2.2g)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
n∈Ve
PFRb,n
 ∑
g∈G(n)
Pg(t)− dn(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Plmax,ab ,∀t, b (5.2.2h)
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∑
g∈G
Pg(t) =
∑
n∈Ve
dn(t). ∀t (5.2.2i)
The vectors Xg and Xg are defined as follows:
Xg = [P
min
g , 0, 0, ..., 0]
T ,
Xg = [P
min
g , P
max
g,2 , P
max
g,3 , ..., P
max
g,q , ..., P
max
g,|Q|]
T
where Pmaxg,q is generator g production upper-limit corresponding to segment q of the
piece-wise constant cost-function. Note that in this constraint, the generation for
segment 1 is forced to be equal to Pming .
Constraints (5.2.2b)-(5.2.2d) ensures that generator g does not violate its gener-
ation limits. Constraints (5.2.2e)-(5.2.2g) define the requirements on the amount of
spinning and non-spinning reserves, and constraints (5.2.2h)-(5.2.2i) are the power-
flow model.
2) Ramp-Rate Limits
Provided generation reserve is limited by the ramp-rate limits of the genera-
tors, and are enforced through constraints (5.2.3a)-(5.2.3f). Constraints (5.2.3g) and
(5.2.3h) on the other hand impose the hourly inter-temporal constraint on the gen-
erators.
0 ≤ [Rg(t)]m ≤ [Sg]1.ug(t), ∀t, g ∈ Ga,m = 1, 2 (5.2.3a)
[Rg(t)]m = 0 ∀t, g /∈ Ga,m = 1, 2 (5.2.3b)
[1, 0, 1, 0].Rg(t) ≤ [Sg]2.ug(t), ∀t, g (5.2.3c)
0 ≤ [Rg(t)]4 ≤ [Sg]2.(1− ug(t)), ∀t, g ∈ Gf (5.2.3d)
[Rg(t)]4 = 0, ∀t, g /∈ Gf (5.2.3e)
0 ≤ [Rg(t)]3, ∀t, g (5.2.3f)
Pg(t)− Pg(t− 1) ≤ [Sg]3.ug(t− 1) + [Sg]5.vg(t), (5.2.3g)
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Pg(t− 1)− Pg(t) ≤ [Sg]3.ug(t)+
[Sg]4.(vg(t)− ug(t) + ug(t− 1)). ∀t, g
(5.2.3h)
For generator g, the ramp-rate limit vector is defined as:
Sg = [s
5
g, s
10
g , s
60
g , s
SD
g , s
SU
g ]
T
where the elements correspond to the generator 5-minute, 10-minute, 60-minute, shut-
down, and start-up ramp-rate limit, respectively.
In these constraints, the time horizon over which the commitment problem is
solved is treated cyclically, i.e.,
t− s ≡ T − (t− s) ∀ s ≥ t. (5.2.4)
3) Commitment Variable Constraints
The explicit constraints on the unit commitment variables are presented in eqs. (5.2.5a)-
(5.2.5d). Similar to the previous part, the time horizon is cyclical in these equations.
ug(t) ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ vg(t) ≤ 1, ∀t, g (5.2.5a)
vg(t) ≥ ug(t)− ug(t− 1), ∀t, g (5.2.5b)
t∑
s=t−UTg+1
vg(s) ≤ ug(t), ∀t, g (5.2.5c)
t∑
s=t−DTg+1
vg(s) ≤ 1− ug(t−DTg), ∀t, g (5.2.5d)
5.2.2 Gas Grid Constraints
Constraints (5.1.4a)-(5.1.4d),∑
w∈W(i)
Gw(t) +
∑
k∈µ+i
(
f+k (t)− f−k (t)
)−
∑
k∈µ−i
(
f+k (t)− f−k (t)
)− ∑
g∈S(i)
Pg(t)ηg = Li(t),
∀t, i (5.2.6)
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Constraints (5.1.7a)-(5.1.7b), and (5.1.9)-(5.1.14).
Compared to the nodal balance constraint in (5.1.4e), the new nodal balance
constraint of the gas grid in (5.2.6) includes the demand of the gas-fired generators
supplied from the gas grid, where Pg(t) is also a variable for the electric grid. This
equation is, in fact, what couples the two infrastructures.
Based on the current common practice, it is assumed that the compressor ratio is
set by the operator heuristically rather than being optimally chosen, and is imported
in the formulation as a parameter over the normal operation.
5.3 Coordinated N-1 Generator Contingency Analysis
Coordinated scheduling of the two infrastructures over the normal operation is
necessary but not sufficient. This becomes more evident when we look at the problem
in the context of N-1 generator contingency analysis, where losing a large generator
usually means a sudden increase in natural-gas demand. The increase is due to the
re-dispatch/commitment of the gas-fired generators to support the grid with spinning
and, more critically, non-spinning reserves. Therefore, it is important to make sure
that the planned contingency dispatch respects the constraints of the gas and electric
grid using a coordinated N-1 generator contingency analysis.
The following constraints are then added to the GECUC formulation to account
for N-1 generator contingency analysis.
5.3.1 Power Grid Constraints
Constraint (5.3.1a) enforces the power flow in the lines to stay within the rate-c
limit after a generator contingency occurs. The required contingency reserve and the
limits on the available contingency reserve are imposed through constraints (5.3.1b)-
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(5.3.1e). ∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
n∈Ve
PFRb,n
 ∑
g∈G(n)
(Pg(t) + r
c
g(t))− dn(t)
−
PFRb,n(c)Pg=c(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Plmax,cb , ∀t, b, c
(5.3.1a)
∑
g∈G
rcg(t) = Pg=c(t), ∀t, c (5.3.1b)
rcg=c(t) = 0, ∀t, c (5.3.1c)
0 ≤ rcg(t) ≤ [0, 0, 1, 1].Rg(t), ∀t, g, c (5.3.1d)
Pming .ug(t) ≤ Pg(t) + rcg(t), ∀t, g, c (5.3.1e)
5.3.2 Gas Grid Constraints
For each contingency , c, and time t, the required contingency gas reserve after loss
of a generator and the limits on the gas pressure and the available gas reserve during
the contingency are imposed through constraints presented in (5.3.2a)-(5.3.2k).
0 ≤ rgcw(t) ≤ rgw(t), ∀w (5.3.2a)∑
w∈W
rgcw(t) =
∑
g∈Gw
rcg(t)ηg, (5.3.2b)
∑
w∈W(i)
(Gw(t) + rg
c
w(t)) +
∑
k∈µ+(i)
(
f c
+
k (t)− f c
−
k (t)
)
−
∑
k∈µ−(i)
(
f c
+
k (t)− f c
−
k (t)
)
−
∑
g∈S(i)
(Pg(t) + r
c
g(t))ηg = GLi(t),
∀i (5.3.2c)
ρ2k(t)p˜i
c
i (t)− p˜icj(t) = h(k)(γc
+
k (t)− γc
−
k (t)), ∀k (5.3.2d)
γc
+
k (t) >= α[n]f
c+
k (t) + β[n], ∀k, n (5.3.2e)
γc
−
k (t) >= α[n]f
c−
k (t) + β[n], ∀k, n (5.3.2f)
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f c
−
k (t) = 0, ∀k ∈ Eag (5.3.2g)
0 ≤ f c+k (t) ≤M1.Zck(t), ∀k (5.3.2h)
0 ≤ f c−k (t) ≤M1.(1− Zck(t)), ∀k /∈ Eag (5.3.2i)
p˜imini ≤ p˜ici (t) ≤ p˜imaxi , ∀i (5.3.2j)
ρ2k(t)p˜i
c
i (t) ≤ p˜imaxpipe , ∀k ∈ Eag (5.3.2k)
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we first show how an uncoordinated UC and OGF can lead to
an infeasible solution. We then show how solving GECUC for the base-case would
mitigate the problem. Finally, we include the coordinated contingency analysis in the
formulation of the GECUC.
In the simulation, the RTS-96 test case is considered as the power grid [Force(1999)].
The modified Belgium high-calorific gas grid in Fig. 5.4.1 is considered in this study,
with original grid data found in [De Wolf and Smeers(2000)]. The following modifi-
cations/assumptions are made in the gas grid data-set:
• All the gas wells/storage maximum production limits are increased by 75% to
account for the increased demand due to gas-fired generators,
• The given gas load data is the net demand for a day that is first divided by 24
to obtain average hourly load. This hourly value is considered as the mean of a
Gaussian random demand with standard deviation equal to 10−3 of the mean
value to consider for daily variations.
• The average hourly load of node 20 is assumed to be 1.5×104m3/h higher than
the given value.
• It is assumed that node 18 has a load with mean value 105m3/h, and therefore
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Figure 5.4.1: Belgium High-Calorific Natural Gas Grid.
the minimum pressure is changed from 0 in the main data-set to be equal to
minimum pressure of node 10.
• The values for hij are converted to hourly basis from daily basis.
• In the original data-set, there are a few parallel pipelines that are removed in
the modified case. For parallel pipelines with different properties, the one with
smaller diameter is removed.
• 50 MW gas-fired generators in RTS are modeled as combined cycle with effi-
ciency 50%.
• 20 MW gas-fired generators in RTS are modeled as only gas turbines with
efficiency 35%.
• It is assumed that 1 ft3 of natural-gas can produce energy equal to 1109 BTU .
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5.4.1 Uncoordinated UC and OGF Results
In this case, the UC is first solved and the gas-fired generators dispatch is sent to
the OGF as parameters from the UC. The location of the gas fired generators that
are assumed to be supplied from the Belgium grid are listed below:
Gas Node # RTS Bus # Generators IDs
12 101 1,2 (of 4)
18 102 1,2 (of 4)
20 122 1,2 (of 6)
6 322 3,4,5 (of 6)
Also, the compressor ratios are assumed to be: ρ8−9(t) = 1, ρ17−18(t) = 1.25.
The UC is solved with MIP Gap=0.1%, using GUROBI solver. In Fig. 5.4.2
top, the dispatch of some of the gas generators supplied from the studied gas grid is
presented. From Fig. 5.4.2 bottom, it can be observed that if this schedule were to be
implemented, the gas-flow limit on pipeline 17-18 would be violated. This flow limit
has been obtained assuming one end has the maximum pressure and the other end
has the minimum pressure, and therefore the flow in he pipeline is at its maximum.
This situation may not be attained because of the limits that other nodes put on
the pressure. For this uncoordinated scenario, what would happen in practice is a
shortage in gas-delivery due to the pressure drop. This example highlights the fact
that uncoordinated scheduling of the gas and electric can lead to infeasibility.
5.4.2 GECUC Results
In this case, with the same generator locations and assumption as the unco-
ordinated case, we run the optimization using the unified formulation with MIP
Gap=0.1%. Comparing the generators dispatch in this case to the uncoordinated
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Figure 5.4.2: Uncoordinated UC and OGF.
Table 5.1: Electric Grid UC Cost
Uncoordinated $2.9484M
Coordinated $2.9676M
case, it can be seen that the uncoordinated case changes the gas-fired generators
profile. Sometimes they are not committed to respect the gas grid constraints. In-
tuitively, this should have come at the expense of higher electric grid UC cost. As
expected, the cost in the coordinated case is higher than that of uncoordinated (c.f.
Table. 5.1) but the results are feasible for both gas and electric infrastructures.
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Figure 5.4.3: Dispatch results for GECUC.
5.4.3 GECUC with coordinated N-1 Generator Contingency Analysis Results
In the scenario, the GECUC is solve along with the coordinated N-1 generator
contingency analysis. The following gas-fired generators in RTS are assumed to be
supplied from the Belgium Grid:
Gas Node # RTS Bus # Generators IDs
20 101 1,2 (of 4)
18 102 1,2 (0f 4)
12 122 1,2,3 (of 6)
6 322 3,4,5 (of 6)
Also, the compressor ratios are assumed to be: ρ8−9(t) = 1, ρ17−18(t) = 1.25 To
illustrate a case, where coordinated N-1 generator contingency analysis is necessary,
the assumed list of gas-fired generators supplied by the Belgium Grid is different in
117
here compared to part A.
Fig. 5.4.4 illustrates the reserves that need to be activated in the gas wells/storage
and gas-fired generators when generator 90 is out of service. It can be noted that the
gas reserve pattern successfully tracks the pattern of the gas-fired generators activated
reserve to meet the required demand.
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